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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The objective of this thesis is to study whether stock market driven acquisitions -theory by 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and market valuation and merger waves -theory by Rhodes-Krofp 
and Viswanathan (2003) affect the acquirer’s choice of method of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions. The empirical focus of the study is two-folded. Firstly, I study the connection 
between method of payment and market-to-book -ratios of the target and acquirer. Secondly, I 
study the effects that periods of high stock market valuation levels have on the choice over 
method of payment.
DATA
The data in this study comprises of global mergers and acquisitions announced between January 
1, 1998 and December 31, 2003. The data concerning mergers and acquisitions is acquired from 
the Sécurités Data Corporation’s (SDC) database while accounting and share price data are from 
Thomson Financial Worldscope database.
METHODOLOGY
I use independent sample t-tests to compare the market-to-book -ratios of stock and cash 
acquirers. Logistic regression model is used to estimate the effects of the variables on the 
method of payment.
RESULTS
Evidence from 1622 mergers and acquisitions globally provides no indication that overvaluation 
measured by industry adjusted market-to-book -ratio increases the likelihood of stock financing. 
On the contrary, the logit model indicates that periods of high stock market valuations are 
statistically significant at 1% level in defining the method of payment. Furthermore, a sub­
sample consisting of 150 U.S. based transactions indicates with 5% statistical significance that 
high acquirer market-to-book -ratios are a factor in choosing stock as method of payment.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
During the last two decades, mergers and acquisitions has been one of the most researched areas in 
finance literature. Event studies about the stock market reactions to merger announcements, studies 
about the long-term post-merger share price performance and research papers about the accounting 
performance of merged companies are numerous.
An interesting detail in the merger activity is the existence of merger waves. From the U.S. 
perspective there were five distinct merger waves during the twentieth century (Ali-Yrkkö, 2002), 
and a common characteristic for each of these waves was a period of economic prosperity and 
favorable stock market conditions. The latest wave took place in the 1990s and according to 
Andrade et al. (2001) most of these deals were stock financed.
The neoclassical theory of mergers and acquisitions (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) states that the 
historically evident waves of mergers and acquisitions are results of changes in industry structures - 
i.e. the waves are caused by industry shocks. The Q-Theory of mergers and acquisitions (Jovanovic 
and Rousseau 2002) argues that a firm’s merger and acquisition investment rate should rise with the 
ratio of the firm’s market value to replacement costs of its assets (Q-ratio). Jovanovic and Rousseau 
argue that merger waves occurring during periods of high stock market valuations are thus evidence 
that mergers are a channel through which capital flows to better projects and better management.
On the contrary to the traditional theories, this study concentrates on the stock market valuation 
levels and motives for selecting the method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. While 
increasing merger activity during periods of high stock market valuation can be explained by 
traditional theories, it is more difficult to explain why more highly valuated companies prefer to use 
stock rather than cash in financing their acquisitions. According to recent theories by Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003), also the stock market valuation levels 
may have impact on the market for mergers and acquisitions especially when considering the choice 
of method of payment.
The main insight of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) is that managers of overvalued companies use the 
overvalued equity to purchase other companies from the market before market valuations return to 
reflect their fundamental values. The managers of target companies are either paid of or their 
investment horizons are significantly shorter which gives them incentive to accept the deals.
Especially interesting is that the theory by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) includes an assumption that 
the financial markets are not rational - i.e. efficient - but the managers deciding on mergers and 
acquisitions are. Basically, this is the opposite of the Hubris theory by Roll (1986) which assumed 
efficient financial markets but presented the managers as irrational destroyers of shareholder value 
while being ‘hyped out’ by their past performance.
While Shleifer and Vishny propose that managers of target companies accept the overvalued equity 
because of different investment horizons or due to personal gains, the theory of Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2003) is based on information asymmetries. They propose that during periods of hot 
stock markets it is more difficult to determine which part of overvaluation is market-wide and 
which part is firm-specific. Consequently the inability of the target firms to distinguish effects of 
market overvaluation from synergy when evaluating acquirers bid leads to increased use of stock as 
a medium of exchange during levels of high stock market valuations.
Overvaluation of the acquirer in stock financed mergers has been evident in several distinctive 
cases. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) mention the infamous merger between America 
Online and Time Warner as an example of acquiring firm taking advantage of its inflated share 
price. The shareholders of Time Warner that held on to the stocks offered by AOL have suffered an 
enormous loss while the AOL-Time Warner stock has plummeted from pre-announcement price of 
$73.75 on January 7th 2000 to $16.82 on April 19th 2004. On the contrary, there seems to be a quite 
high possibility that the original shareholders of AOL are actually better of with the merger 
compared to what might have happened if it never had come true.
The Finnish-Swedish Enso Oy - STORA Ab forestry merger in 1998 is another case that fits the 
Shleifer and Vishny theory1. The ownership of the merged company was split according to share 
prices and Stora’s share price had risen sharply during the last twelve months preceding the merger.
1 Kauppalehti 12.6.1998 ”FM Pankkiiriliike arvostelee Stora Enso -fuusion vaihtosuhdetta”
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On the contrary, the government owned Enso had no such momentum and thus according to some 
critics the ownership was not split fairly when looking at the fundamentals and synergy benefits.
Moreover, mergers and acquisitions as a phenomenon are utmost interesting since they are directly 
linked to the socioeconomic mega-trend of our time - the globalization and integration of world­
wide markets. Furthermore, during the course of my studies the collapse of stock market’s so called 
internet bubble shifted my attention from efficient market hypothesis towards behavioral finance 
approach. Therefore studying a theory of mergers and acquisitions based on market inefficiency has 
been a very interesting task on the personal level.
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND PURPOSE
This study examines a global sample of mergers and acquisitions announced between January 1, 
1998 and December 31, 2003. The main purpose of this thesis is to study whether overvaluation 
proxied by market-to-book -ratios have effect on the choice of method of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions. Research problems are highlighted below:
Research problem 1:
Does the share price valuation level proxied by market-to-book -ratio affect acquirer’s choice of 
method of payment in mergers and acquisitions?
Research problem 2:
Does period of high overall stock market valuation create conditions under which high market-to- 
book firms able to better take advantage of their high valuations through stock financed 
acquisitions?
First research problem stems from stock market driven acquisitions theory Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) and second research problem derives from combining Shleifer and Vishny predictions with 
the theory of Rhodes-Кгоф and Viswanathan (2003), both of which will be further discussed in the 
theoretical part of this thesis.
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As already said in the background chapter, an important aspect of this study is that it assumes 
inefficient financial markets. The assumption is based on the fact that both of the key theories in 
this thesis question market efficiency as well. The theoretical model of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
assumes zero synergies and inefficient financial markets that are affected by heuristics and 
psychological sentiment. The theory of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) is based on 
correlated misinformation and on the fact that managers of acquirer and target firms have private 
information about the value of their companies - which implies rejection of at least strong form 
market efficiency.
Intuitively it does appear to be a complicated idea to use market-to-book -ratios to measure 
misvaluation since they are a commonly accepted proxy for growth opportunities. However, the 
persistence of В/M -anomalies first identified by Rosenberg et al. (1985) and recently evidenced by 
Chan and Lakonishok (2004) does indicate that under certain conditions market-to-book -ratio may 
also be used as a proxy for under- and overvaluation. Most importantly, the validity of this study 
does not require that market-to-book -ratio would be a better proxy for rational fundamental value 
than the share price nor that market-to-book would not simultaneously contain information about 
the firms’ growth opportunities. All I am saying is that if it can be shown that differences in market- 
to-book -ratio cause firms to act as predicted by theories written about stock market influenced 
acquisitions, it would be fair to suggest that there is a relation between market-to-book -ratio and 
takeover behavior.
Additional objective of this study is reviewing the literature regarding two key areas of the thesis: 
Theories explaining motives for mergers and acquisitions and theories concerning the choice of 
method of payment in M&A.
1.3 MAIN RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The main result of this thesis is that evidence from 1622 mergers and acquisitions globally taking 
place between 1998-2003 does not provide any indication that acquirer overvaluation measured by 
industry adjusted market-to-book -ratios increase the likelihood of stock financing. Even though the 
market-to-book -ratios of stock acquirers are on average somewhat higher than those of cash 
acquirers, the results of a logit regression offer no support for the hypothesis that high market-to- 
book -ratios would be a factor in choosing the method of payment. Therefore, this thesis rejects the 
predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) at least on the general level.
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On the contrary, the logit model indicates that months classified as periods of high stock market 
valuations are statistically significant at 1% level in defining the method of payment. Consistently, 
months classified as periods of low stock market valuations have negative effect on the stock 
payment. The latter result is statistically significant at 5% level, thus supporting the theory by 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan.
Furthermore, a logit regression of a sub-sample consisting of 150 acquisitions with an acquirer 
domiciled in the U.S. indicate with 5% statistical significance that high acquirer market-to-book - 
ratios are a factor in choosing stock as method of payment during periods of high stock market 
valuations. Intuitively it can be stated that the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny do not apply to an 
average deal. Therefore the result of this thesis that high market-to-book -ratios are a significant 
factor in choosing the method of payment in M&A is supporting the Shleifer and Vishny theory.
The general applicability of the results of this thesis is subject to several constraints. Firstly, the data 
set is limited to six years containing the up and down movements of the stock market around the 
change of the millennium. In order to be able to generalize any of the results, it would be necessary 
to study whether they hold also during other time periods. Moreover, when considering the results 
of this thesis it must be stated that the method of estimating the industry averages of market-to-book 
-ratios is subject to selection bias. This is due to the fact that the sample for forming the industry 
averages consists of companies involved in takeovers between years 1998 and 2003. Moreover, 
since there is no academically approved measure for periods of high and low stock market 
valuations the results are also subject to the robustness of the methodology used for classifying 
overall stock market valuation levels. Finally, the results can also be disputed since the M/В -ratio 
has been used as a proxy for both growth opportunities and overvaluation.
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
After introduction, I will look into the relevant theories including market efficiency, motives for 
mergers and acquisitions and alternative theories for choosing method of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions. The third chapter includes results of past empirical research and the fourth chapter 
includes a description of the sample selection process and hypotheses development. In the fifth 
chapter I will briefly go though the research methodology. Both descriptive statistics and results of 
univariate tests and logistic regressions will be introduced in Chapter six. Finally, Chapter seven 
includes concluding discussion and summarizes the findings of the Thesis.
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1.5 KEY DEFINITIONS
Acquisition - Merger - Takeover:
Academic literature uses terms mergers, acquisitions and takeovers sometimes interchangeably and 
sometimes to indicate distinctions in takeover characteristics. Terms acquisition and tender offer 
sometimes denote transactions where the bidder makes an offer directly to the shareholders of the 
target company, whereas term merger indicates a negotiated deal between target and acquirer 
management.
This thesis uses terms deal, transaction, merger, acquisition and takeover interchangeably to denote 
the process of combining two companies except for in the cases where distinction of acquisition 
type is relevant. Furthermore, target and acquired company as well as terms acquirer, buyer and 
bidder are used interchangeably in this thesis.
Behavioral Finance Theory:
Behavioral finance is a theory stating that there are important psychological and behavioral 
variables involved in investing in the stock market that may cause the security prices to deviate 
from the intrinsic value based on economic fundamentals.
Efficient Markets Theory (EMH):
A theory stating that in an efficient market the prices of securities will reflect a rational assessment 
of the true underlying worth of stocks; the prices will have fully and accurately discounted all 
available information. Since the theory assumes that news arise randomly in the future it predicts 
that stock prices will approximate to a Brownian motion pattern (i.e. random walk) of price 
movement and that technical analysis and statistical forecasting are likely to be fruitless.
Fundamental (Intrinsic) Value of a Firm:
Fundamental value is the net present value of a firm’s expected future cash flows discounted by the 
required rate of return.
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Joint-Hypothesis Problem:
Joint-hypothesis problem states that a test of market efficiency is always simultaneously a test of 
the market model. This causes problems for academic consensus about market efficiency, since 
whether research results either support or deny efficient market hypothesis, it can be always argued 
that the result was due to imperfections in the model used in the study. Joint-hypothesis problem is 
one of the key reasons for my decision to abandon the idea of long-term abnormal returns approach 
in favor of market-to-book approach.
Market-to-book -ratio:
Market-to-book -ratio (M/В) is the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets. Please 
note that some studies in this thesis use book-to-market (В/M) or book-to-price -ratios (В/P) which 
are the opposite of M/B-ratio - i.e. low В/P -ratio is high M/B-ratio.
Tobin’s q (a.k.a. the q-ratio):
Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of assets over the replacement value of assets. Perfect and 
Wiles (1994) show that Tobin’s q and the market-to-book -ratio are highly correlated (0.96). I 
therefore make no distinction between Tobin’s q and the market-to-book -ratio in this study.
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2 THEORY REVIEW
Due to the fact that the key theories of this study are related to market efficiency, merger motives 
and method of payment, the range of the literature and theory review of this thesis is very 
comprehensive. It begins with a short review of market efficiency, continues with traditional 
motives of mergers and acquisitions before introducing merger theories based on market valuations. 
The last section of theoretical review concentrates on market-to-book -ratio and alternative theories 
of method of payment in mergers and acquisitions.
2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK - MARKET EFFICIENCY
This chapter introduces the key theoretical framework of the study - specifically the theories of 
efficient market hypothesis and basic concepts of behavioral finance. While is not plausible to 
present complete review of the efficient market literature, a brief overview of the theory will 
provide the necessary background information for this study.
2.1.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) originates from Kendall’s (1953) finding that security 
prices follow a random walk and cannot be forecasted merely by looking into the historical time- 
series of their past returns. The concept was further developed in the 1960s and in his seminal 
article titled “Efficient Capital Markets” Fama (1970) defined efficient markets as markets where at 
any point in time security prices ‘fully reflect’ all available information.
Furthermore, Fama divided market efficiency according to the definition of information into three 
different categories: weak-form, semi-strong-form and strong-form market efficiency. By 
definition, the weak-form efficiency is included in the semi-strong-form efficiency concept and 
correspondingly the semi-strong-ffom is included in the strong form efficiency concept.
In the weak-form of market efficiency, ‘information’ refers merely to the historical record of past 
prices. In other words, under weak-form efficiency prices reflect all information contained in the 
record of past prices in such way that any trading system based on only pricing history cannot 
produce superior risk-adjusted returns.
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In the semi-strong-form market efficiency the definition of information is broadened to all publicly 
available information including e.g. financial records and past news about the company in question. 
Put it more explicitly, the semi-strong market efficiency requires that all new information - such as 
earnings announcements, profit warnings and merger announcements - coming to the market 
should be incorporated into security prices quickly and correctly. In practice this means that the 
security prices should adjust to news events immediately without any post-announcement drift 
either in form of an upward trend or a downward reversal.
Strong-form market efficiency requires that all information, including that of insiders, is fully 
reflected in the security prices. In other words, the question is whether there are any investors in the 
market who have private information not yet reflected in the current security prices.
Since the EMH is a theoretical abstraction, some more practical definitions are useful to further 
enlighten the concept. Jensen (1978) defined market efficiency in an academically relaxed but 
economically more rational way: “security prices reflect information to the point where the 
marginal benefits of acting rationally on information exceed the marginal costs”. Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) expanded the view of EMH in the similar way by arguing that prices can not 
perfectly reflect the information since obtaining information in the real world is costly.
2.1.2 Critique of the Efficient Market Hypothesis - Behavioral Finance
Contrary to the EMH, the theories of behavioral finance do not presume that the stock market is 
always efficient. Behavioral finance approach presumes that in addition to rational economic 
factors, the share prices are affected by irrational - psychological - elements, which impact human 
behavior in all walks of life including the science (and art) of investments.
As most economic theories, the EMH is based on several assumptions. Beyond the natural 
assumption of the hypothesis that investors maximize their own wealth, Shleifer (2002) summarizes 
key theoretical foundations of the EMH as follows:
1. Investors are rational and value securities based purely on fundamentals
2. To the extent that some investors are not rational, their trades are random and therefore 
cancel each other out
3. Rational arbitrageurs eliminate the influence of non-random irrationality
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Shleifer (2002) further presents both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to suggest that 
none of the three arguments hold in the real world.
Firstly, investor rationality is criticized by the Prospect Theory developed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). Kahneman and Tversky found that contrary to expected utility theory, people 
placed different weights on gains and losses and on different ranges of probability. Firstly, they 
found that people put much more weight on the prospective losses compared to equivalent sized 
gains. Moreover, they found that people will respond differently to equivalent situations depending 
on the framing of the question, i.e. whether it is presented in the context of losses or gains. 
Furthermore, the evidence of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) shows that people do not deviate from 
rationality randomly but rather form their biased judgments in the similar ways.
The argument that people are more sensitive to losses than gams makes them reluctant to realize 
losses and hence also perhaps reluctant to hold risky equity. Supporting the previous argument 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) find that the size of the equity premium over bonds is consistent with 
the predictions of the prospect theory.
In case the psychological factors cause market prices of some securities to deviate from their 
fundamental values, it creates an opportunity for arbitrage, i.e. the simultaneous purchase of 
undervalued securities and selling overvalued securities with essentially similar risk characteristics. 
However, due to the fact that there are not exact substitutes for most of the securities the 
opportunity for arbitrage is limited. Also the noise trader risk (see e.g. De Long et al. 1990) may 
present limits to arbitrage and therefore allow the security prices to deviate from fundamental 
values (Shleifer 2002).
2.1.3 Implications to Mergers and Acquisitions Research
As stated above, the efficient market hypothesis suggests that the market value of a company’s 
share price reflects an unbiased estimate of all publicly available information about the firm’s future 
cash flows and the related risk level. Therefore, according to the EMH the price impact of any 
merger or acquisition announcement should immediately reflect the economic rationality of the 
transaction.
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As later discussed in the empirical evidence chapter of this study the evidence of the accuracy of 
price impact is mixed. An example of irrational merger activity is the wave of diversifying 
conglomerate mergers around 1970 that has been widely regarded as value destroying activity and 
at least a partial cause for the break-up merger wave in the 1980s. However, paradoxically the 
initial event returns to acquirers were positive in many cases suggesting that market efficiency did 
not hold during the conglomerate wave (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991).
However, from practical point of view perhaps the most important concept associated with the 
efficient market hypothesis is the joint-hypothesis problem. It states that a test of market efficiency 
is always simultaneously a test of the market model used in the study, as further emphasized in 
Fama’s article “Efficient Capital Markets II” (Fama 1991). This makes it virtually impossible to 
make a watertight case for or against market efficiency and leads to discussion about 
methodological issues beyond the scope of this study (see e.g. Lyon et al. 1999).
However, both the theoretical debate and empirical findings for and against market efficiency 
continue to be contradicting. Therefore, it is an interesting task to test whether the Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) predictions stemming from market 
inefficiency and information asymmetry will hold. In addition, an important element for this study 
is that the efficient market hypothesis does not provide any indications that there should be any 
association between market-to-book value and method of payment in mergers and acquisitions.
2.2 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN GENERAL
As stated in the introduction, mergers and acquisitions have been widely researched topics during 
several decades. In addition to the uncountable number of finance studies written about the subject, 
M&A has been frequent subject also in studies written from perspectives of several other disciplines 
of social and economic sciences.
Many disciplines have also been intersecting with the finance perspective. Especially management 
science studies have concentrated on the implementation phase and post-implementation 
performance of merged companies. For example Vaara (1999), Very et al. (1997) and Weber et al. 
(1996) study cultural fit and post-merger performance and Chatteijee et al. (1992) write about 
shareholder value and cultural differences in merging companies.
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In order to widen the overall picture of the disciplinary orientations covering mergers and 
acquisitions as a phenomenon beyond financial economics, Table 1 below includes examples of 
theoretical approach categorizations of mergers and acquisitions.
Table 1: Disciplinary Orientations Categorizing Mergers and Acquisitions








Finance Overpayment Finance Capital markets








Modified from Tarvainen 2003 (Table 23: M&A research streams as identified in recent overviews 
of the field, p. 241)
From the perspective of financial economics, however, the fundamental function of mergers and 
acquisitions is that new owners can put the transferred assets into better use in economic terms. 
After all, allocation of scarce assets in the most rational way is the main purpose of capital markets.
While the other approaches presented in the Table 1 are useful in understanding mergers and 
acquisitions as a phenomenon of modem society, a finance textbook approach seems most 
appropriate for this particular research. Therefore, to large extent Chapter 2.3 describing the 
traditional motives for mergers and acquisitions follows the categorization of Weston et al. (2001) 





Many summarizing books and studies have noted the occurrence of merger waves that have been a 
major empirical driver in the development of both Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2003) theories. For example Weston et al. (2001) and Ali-Yrkkö (2002) discuss 
merger waves and their industry and macro-level causes. From the standpoint of U.S. economy 
there have been five distinct periods of high merger activity during the past 150 years. Table 2 
below describes the waves and key drivers behind increased merger activity.
Table 2: Merger Waves of the Twentieth Century
Time Description Key Drivers Results
1897-
1904








Vertical Mergers Upturn in business activity, utilization



























Wave of Mega deals
Strong economic recovery,




Sources: Ali-Yrkkö (2002), Parviainen (2003), Weston et al. (2001)
What can also be noted is that merger waves have taken place during times of economic prosperity 
and high stock market valuations. It also seems that top management’s tendency towards empire­
building escalates in good times (Stallworthy and Kharbanda 1988, 105-106).
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2.2.2 Industry Clustering and Neoclassical M&A Drivers
Andrade et al. (2001) present evidence that increased merger activity concentrates on specific 
industries. This effect can be seen as supportive for the Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) theory since it 
predicts such industry clustering as a result of changes in corporate environment. However, in case 
efficient market hypothesis is abandoned, periods of high overvaluations within some industry 
sectors may lead to increased mergers and acquisitions activity also according to Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) theory of market driven acquisitions. Table 3 below shows hot merger industries 
during three decades.
Table 3: Hot M&A Industries
1970s 1980s 1990s
Metal Mining Oil and Gas Metal Mining
Real Estate Textile Media and Telecom.
Oil and Gas Manufacturing Banking
Apparel Non-Depository Credit Real Estate
Machinery Food Hotels
Ranked by market values. Sources: Ali-Yrkkö (2002), Andrade et al. (2001)
Furthermore, consistently with the industry shock theory by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Weston 
et al. (2001) list seven change forces related to recent merger activity in the 1990s. Table 4 below 
presents these change forces.
Table 4: Neoclassical Drivers of Mergers and Acquisitions in 1990s
The Seven Change Forces
1. Technological change
2. Globalization and freer trade
3. Deregulation
4. Economies of scale and scope, complementarity and need to catch up technologically
5. Changes in industry organization
6. Individual entrepreneurship
7. Rising stock prices, low interest rates, strong economic growth
Adapted from Table 1.4 in Weston et al. (2001) p. 4
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2.3 TRADITIONAL MOTIVES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Finance literature presents several theories about the motives of mergers and acquisitions that are 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. The key motives can be summarized in five 
categories as follows:




5. Undervaluation and stock market influenced theories2
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) present an illustrative summary table representing the overall 
gain patterns of the first three motives. By testing correlation between different gains in U.S. tender 
offers between 1963 and 1988 Berkovitch and Narayanan conclude that synergy is the dominant 
motive for acquisitions and value-destroying acquisitions are driven by agency rather than hubris. 
Aggregate gain from the fourth motive - redistribution - is understandably zero.
Table 5: Summary Table of Gains in M&A
Motive Total Gains Gains to Target Gains to Acquirer
Efficiency or synergy + + +
Hubris 0 + -
Agency problems, mistakes - + -
Source: Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993)
2 Undervaluation and stock market influenced theories will be discussed in Chapter 2.4
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2.3.1 Theories of Value Creation
According to the neoclassical theory of the firm the ultimate purpose of the firm is to maximize 
firm profits or more precisely maximize firm value. Accordingly the dominant motive in the 
economics and finance literature for mergers and acquisitions has been economic performance 
improvement and thereby increased shareholder value.
Since maximizing shareholder value is a too generic motive to explain how a particular deal is 
assumed to lead up to value improvements, the following sub-chapters discuss the different means 
of achieving improvements.
2.3.1.1 Definition of Value Creation
Very often corporate takeovers are justified by the existence of synergies. Basically, the concept of 
synergy means that 2 plus 2 equals more than four, i.e. that the value of the merged company (Vab) 
is greater than the sum of the values of two originally separate companies (VA, Vb).
VAb>(Va + Vb) (1)
Rationally acting managers should engage only in takeovers where price paid for the target (Pb) is 
lower than the value increase for the acquirer (Brealey and Myers 1996).
Pb<VAb-Va (2)
Shelton (1988) offers following explicit definition for value creation: “When an acquisition is 
defined as a combination of the assets of target and bidder firms, value is created when the assets 
are used more efficiently by the combined firm than by target and acquirer separately.”
2.3.1.2 Strategic Realignments
The major argument for mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s was strategic realignment. This 
means that the focal point of the acquisition is either further focusing or a shift in current corporate 
strategy. In practice synergies of a strategic merger may be achieved through each of the other ways 
described in this chapter.
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2.3.1.3 Operating synergy
Synergy can be achieved in both cost side and revenue side. To achieve cost side synergies an 
acquirer and a target must have complementary assets and/or operations that can be more valuable 
combined than when used separately. In practice these gains are achieved by eliminating 
intersecting costs from administration, information technology or from other overlapping 
operations. For example in the Nordic stock exchange merger between OM AB and Hex Oyj in 
summer 2003, IT expenditure was expected to be a major source of synergy benefits.
The underlying theory of efficiency improvements is the existence of economies of scale. This 
simply means that by dividing the fixed costs by a larger number of products or services, the total 
costs per unit can be reduced. Since economies of scale diminish with the growth of production 
level, an underlying assumption here is that prior to the merger firms are operating at levels where 
they fall short of achieving the full potential economies of scale in their particular industry.
In addition to cost savings, synergies can also be achieved on the revenue side. For example a 
company strong on marketing and another company strong on logistics can gain competitive 
advantage by combining their competencies by merging. Obviously these gains can also be 
achieved through joint ventures or strategic alliances, but difficulties of creating comprehensive, 
binding and at the same time flexible contracts between two separate legal entities often make a 
merger look like a more feasible solution.
Furthermore, companies with different but related products can merge their activities in a way that 
two separate clienteles can be offered products of both companies using combined sales force, and 
thus higher profits can be achieved. For example the bankassurance trend (Fabozzi et al. 2002 p. 
104) that begun in the 1990s has been largely based on the idea that by combining an insurance 
company and a bank with only partly overlapping client-bases an opportunity of cross-selling 
products and services is created. The merger of formerly state-owned bank Leonia and insurance 
company Sampo in 2000 is an illustrative example from Finland.
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2.3.1.4 Managerial Efficiency Increases
Weston et al. (2001) define replacement of incompetent incumbent management - the main motive 
of corporate raiders in 1980s - by words ”efficiency increases”. The basic idea is that the value of 
the target can be increased replacing target management unable to use target’s resources efficiently 
by relatively more competent management of the acquirer. Theoretically also the opposite situation 
is possible, i.e. an acquirer takes advantage of hiring superior management of the target through an 
acquisition.
2.3.1.5 Financial Synergy
The concept of financial synergy is based on the idea of combining a company with excess internal 
cash flows with a company with extensive growth opportunities but insufficient cash flows. The 
synergy gains occur for the reason that asymmetries of information and issuance costs can be 
avoided when financing can be arranged internally. For example Myers and Majluf (1984) discuss 
the issue and state that financial synergy can occur from transferring of financial slack without the 
equity issue discount.
Diversification of equity risk and reduction of default risk have also been argued to be sources of 
financial synergy (Amihud et al. 1986). However, e.g. Brealey and Myers (1996) mention these as 
‘dubious reasons’ for mergers and acquisitions. First of all, shareholders can diversify equity risk in 
the stock market on their own. Secondly, possible gains from reducing the default risk of 
bondholders is offset by the reduction of the shareholders option to default. Marginally thinkings 
minor savings can be achieved from combining two separate debt issues since the fixed cost of 
issuing debt can be reduced significantly.
2.3.1.6 Acquiring Critical Resources or Knowledge
Engaging in mergers and acquisitions can also be seen as an alternative for increasing internal 
capacity. Since building new capacity would result in pressure on prices, mergers and acquisitions 
have been used especially in industries with high existing overall capacity and low growth prospects 
such as the automobile industry. On the other hand, the central motive for acquiring a supplier may 
be securing the availability of critical resources and thus reduction of external uncertainty (Porter 
1980).
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Also, especially mergers between companies that succeed each other in value chain have been 
motivated by the transaction cost theory created by Williamsson (1975). When the costs of 
contracting, communicating and information costs associated in the everyday business become 
substantial, vertical integration can lead to significant savings and thus to value creation.
The above reasoning is useful for instance in analyzing the merger of paper machine manufacturer 
Valmet Oyj and forestry machinery conglomerate Rauma Oyj that created a single company whose 
value chain covers each machine required from cutting a tree in a forest to producing different 
qualities of paper.
Furthermore, some studies have raised transfer of technology as a potential reason for M&A 
activity. For example Lehto and Lehtoranta (2002) argue that a merger which opens access to 
distribution channels and complementary expertise allow a developer of technology to exploit the 
sunk costs of research and development to affect the distribution of returns from the innovation.
Also utilizing the best of different sets of work routines has been hypothesized to be a source of 
merger gains. Morosini et al. (1998) find support for their hypothesis that relatively high level of 
cultural distance between companies will make it more likely that the target will provide a set of 
routines and repertoires that are significantly different from the acquirers. The underlying argument 
here is that the routines and repertoires cannot easily be replicated and thus according to the 




2.3.2.1 Managerialism Theory and Empire-building
Managerialism theory considers mergers and acquisitions as a consequence of agency problems. 
Scholars have argued very early in the literature (Schumpeter, 1934) that managers’ desire for 
“empire-building” may lead to decisions that are not entirely in-line with the interests of 
shareholders. An entrenched manager may see also mergers and acquisitions as a path to achieving 
additional perquisites or increased managerial prestige by enhanced private benefits of control. To 
increase their prestige, managers can use the assets they control to acquire targets that in reality do 
not produce any synergy benefits. An alternative managerial motive would be to make an 
acquisition in order to avoid being acquired by someone else.
2.3.2.2 Agency Problems
Jensen and Meckling (1976) formulated the implications of agency problems in their seminal article 
titled: “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Agency 
problems result from separation of ownership and control in a modem corporation and are most 
likely in companies where managers own only a fraction of the company’s equity.
Furthermore, widely dispersed ownership makes it costly for atomistic shareholders to monitor the 
behavior of managers. This might lead to managers making decisions that are optimal for 
themselves but not in the best interest of the shareholders. Negative NPV projects of extensive 
perquisites such as corporate jets may reflect as a decline in the stock price.
2.3.2.3 Takeovers as a Solution to Agency Problems
Acquisitions can be also seen as a solution to agency problems. If internal control mechanisms fail, 
the market for corporate control provides pressure for managers to keep their focus on shareholder 
value (Fama and Jensen 1983). Otherwise they risk losing their jobs if falling share prices create an 
opportunity for an eager acquirer.
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Practitioners involved in hostile takeover attempts frequently used the arguments created by 
academics. Corporate raiders of 1980s such as T. Boone Pickens and Carl Icahn justified their 
actions by arguing that they were actually doing a favor for the economy by ousting the sluggish 
incumbent managers and replacing them by more competent people who would be able to improve 
company performance in the future.
In the academic world Jensen (1988, 1993) takes the view that takeovers in the 1980s were a result 
of failures of internal forms of corporate governance. Also Holmström and Kaplan (2001) argue 
that a key driver of 1980s hostile takeover activity was managers’ slow response to new business 
environment created by deregulation and technological development.
2.3.2.4 The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
According to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, payout of excess cash relates to the agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Jensen defines free cash flow as cash flow excess of 
what is required to finance all projects that have positive net present values, and hypotheses that 
when managers have cash more than necessary, they use it for negative net present value projects 
such as undesirable acquisitions.
Hartford (1999) analyses acquisition attempts from 1977-1993 and using probit analysis finds that 
cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions. Moreover, in accordance with Jensen (1986) 
the results show that acquisitions by firms with potential free cash flow problems are especially 
poor while each bid by these firms destroys market value for an amount of 7% in their excess cash 
reserve. Also Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) find evidence supporting the argument that 




Roll (1986) applied winner’s curse to mergers and acquisitions and created so called hubris 
hypothesis. Put it simply, the winner’s curse means that the winner of a sealed-bid auction tends to 
be the one who most overestimates the value of the auction object. While winner’s curse concept 
originates from the auction theory, it has been widely applied also in corporate finance research (see 
e.g. Keloharju 1993 about IPOs; Giliberto and Varaiya 1989 about bank acquisitions).
According to Roll (1986), a takeover situation is comparable to an auction, since even though there 
may be no competing takeover bids, market capitalization represents the current highest bid for the 
company. Since it is commonly known that valuation estimates are subject to errors, according to 
standard bidding theory rational bidders are expected to take the winner’s curse and possibility of 
valuation error into account when making their bids. However, if bidders are affected by excessive 
self-confidence which Roll calls hubris, they overpay in takeovers which then results as a value loss 
for the acquiring firm shareholders. (Roll 1986)
A fundamental assumption of Roll’s hubris hypothesis is strong form market efficiency. Therefore, 
the key prediction of the hubris hypothesis is that the overall value creation from takeovers is zero, 
i.e. that the gains of target’s shareholders are offset by equally large losses suffered by acquirer 
shareholders.
Latest evidence of hubris comes from Hietala et al. (2003) who study a special case of a takeover 
contest over Paramount Company by QVC and Viacom. By analyzing the information extracted 
from stock prices around the takeover contest, they find that Viacom as the eventual winner of the 
battle overpaid by over $1.5 billion when it agreed to purchase Paramount for $9.2 billion. 
Furthermore, according to Hietala et al. the market estimated that synergies would have been 
substantially larger between the target and the ultimate loser of the contest. Since overpayment 
occurred in spite of the fact that Viacom CEO owned approximately two thirds of the company, the 
study offers strong support for the hubris hypothesis.
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2.3.4 Theories of Value Redistribution
Mergers and acquisitions can be value increasing actions for the initiating parties even in situations 
where there are no real synergies in the transaction. The source of value increase in these cases is 
redistribution from other stakeholders of the companies involved — i.e. government, labor, 
bondholders, competitors, suppliers and consumers.
2.3.4.1 Redistribution from Government
Avoiding taxation has also been presented as a potential motive for mergers and acquisitions. 
Potential tax benefits are obvious especially when a firm with high cash flows merges with a firm 
with negative profits and high deferred tax benefits. According to Weston et al. (2001) the tax 
benefits in a merger may be substantial but on the other hand evidence shows that they are not 
likely to be the main reason of the merger. It is obvious that financing and organizational form of 
every takeover is structured as such that tax benefits are maximized. Nonetheless, common business 
judgment says that tax benefits are merely additional advantages to the attractiveness of a particular 
deal rather than being the primus causa.
2.3.4.2 Increased Market Power and Excessive Industry concentration
The market power hypothesis derives from the assumption that mergers can result in increased 
monopoly power and therefore adversely affect consumers. This hypothesis applies especially to 
horizontal mergers where firm’s size is increased significantly relative to its competitors.
Some studies especially on the airline industry have found evidence that horizontal mergers lead to 
increase in the market power (Evans and Kessides 1994; Borenstein 1989). Besides increased 
monopoly power of the merged entity, also increased industry consolidation may lead to 
oligopolistic situations that may also have negative impact on price formation/competition.
Indications of excessive consolidation can be found in Eckbo’s (1983) study of horizontal mergers. 
The study showed that mergers have positively contributed to rival’s profits as well and this has 
been interpreted to indicate that the merger has increased market power in the industry.
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While there have been also some supporting evidence for market power hypothesis, according to 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) the gains created by mergers and acquisitions appeared to come solely 
from efficiency gains and not from creation of market power. Also, while market power may have 
been a motive for mergers and acquisitions in the beginning of the twentieth century, modem day 
competition authorities scrutinize transactions so carefully that pursuing market power hardly is 
among the primary motives of mergers and acquisitions (Pautier 2001).
2.3.4.3 Labor
The theory of redistribution from labor refers to a possibility to renegotiate labor contracts. 
Furthermore, also the cost synergies discussed earlier can in some instances come from the 
employees. If people are laid off and simultaneously output and wages remain constant, employees 
are effectively compensated less per efforts put in. Evidence about this theory is scarce and e.g. 
Neumark and Sharpe (1996) find likelihood of being a hostile takeover target does not have an 
effect on the wage structure of the industry therefore denying the distribution hypothesis.
2.3.4.4 Bondholders
The capital structure of the combined company following a merger or an acquisition may differ 
significantly from those of the participant companies. Therefore, bondholders may find themselves 
as owners of securities with different risk characteristics compared to the original securities they 
purchased.
Bondholders generally have covenants and a variety of contractual clauses protecting the value of 
debt. However, if the leverage is increased substantially for example in a leveraged buy-out (LBO), 
unprotected debt may be significantly affected by increased default risk.
Consistently with the above, a majority of the studies find no evidence of such redistribution effect 
(Kim and McConnell 1977, Asquith and Kim 1982, Dennis and McConnell 1986) but studies 
focusing on LBOs find negative impacts on bondholder value (McDaniel 1986, Warga and Welch 
1993).
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2.4 STOCK MARKET INFLUENCED MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
2.4.1 Undervaluation Theories
2.4.1.1 Q-Theory - Undervaluation Aspect
Q-ratio (a.k.a. Tobin’s Q) measures the ratio of market value of a company to the replacement costs 
of company’s assets. Especially for a company seeking to increase capacity, a company with a low 
Tobin’s Q represents an opportunity to acquire needed assets through an acquisition instead of 
buying new assets from the asset markets. The Q-Theory of mergers and acquisitions (Jovanovic 
and Rousseau 2002) argues that a firm’s merger and acquisition investment rate should rise with its 
ratio of firm’s market value to replacement costs of its assets (Q-ratio). Jovanovic and Rousseau 
argue that mergers and acquisitions are a channel through which capital of companies with low q- 
ratios flows to better projects and better management. A low q-ratio was used as a key argument for 
justifying mergers and acquisitions especially in the 1970 (Weston et al. 2001).
2.4.1.2 Information Hypothesis
The information hypothesis stems from the fact that the target firm value experiences a positive 
upward revaluation even when the takeover bid is unsuccessful (Bradley 1980). There are two 
explanations for this value creation resulting from the mere attempt for a takeover. Bradley, Desai 
and Kim (1983) argue that reason for value creation is the fact that the takeover bid reveals new 
information about the company previously unaccounted for in the share price.
Moreover, Weston et al. (2001) describe another potential explanation for the revaluation of the 
target share. Even though the initial bid had been unsuccessful, the markets view that the company 
is now “in the play”, i.e. that either it will subsequently be taken over by another bidder, or the 
incumbent management start implementing more efficient business strategies and operations in 
order to avoid being taken over and potentially losing their jobs.
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2.4.2 Stock Market Driven Acquisitions Theory
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) present a framework of mergers and acquisitions that is based on stock 
market misvaluations. Their model explains who acquires whom, valuation consequences of 
mergers, merger waves and most importantly for this study, an explanation for the choice of 
exchange medium in mergers and acquisitions.
Shleifer and Vishny do not deny the explanatory power of neoclassical theory of mergers and 
acquisitions, but rather offer an additional model for explaining previously unexplained 
implications such as merger waves and whether cash or stock is used to finance the transaction.
By definition the model assumes that market efficiency does not hold, and an important assumption 
is that the managers of acquiring companies act in the best interest of the long-term shareholders. 
Therefore, the assumptions are exactly the opposite of Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis, which 
assumed strong-form market efficiency and irrational management.
2.4.2.1 Model Arithmetic
The model is mathematically very straight-forward, and the arithmetic is discussed in the following 
text. The model assumes that market valuations per unit of capital (Q, Qt), reflect investor 
sentiment i.e. that they deviate from the fundamental values. The model considers two firms: target 
(0) and bidder (1) with:
K, Ki Capital stocks of target (0) and bidder (1)
Q, Qi Prices per unit of capital for target and bidder
Qi > Q Assumption that market values bidder
S Perceived synergy factor, market consensus price per unit of
capital for the merged entity 
Furthermore,
P The price per unit of capital paid by the acquirer
P = Q Point where takeover premium is zero
P = S Point where price reflects the merged short-run valuation of the
combined entity
q Long-run cost per imit of capital (for all companies)
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Total market valuation of the united companies is:
V = S(K + Ki) (3)
Total short-run gains from the merger are:
S ( K + K,) - KQ - KiQj (4)
Furthermore, no-synergy point (S*), where short-run gains from the merger are zero, is as follows:
S*(K + Ki)-KQ-K!Q, = 0 (5)
Key element of the theory is the perceived synergy factor S, which represents the short-run 
valuation per unit of capital affected by heuristics and market sentiment. If S > S*, there exists 
positive perceived synergy and the combined short-run return for target and acquirer is positive. As 
Shleifer and Vishny put it: “S is the story that the market consensus holds about the benefits of the 
merger”.
In order to create maximum contrast to the industry shocks based theory (Mitchell and Mulherin 
1996), Shleifer and Vishny (2003) make a further assumption that there are no long-run efficiency 
improvements associated with mergers. In the model this means that in the long-run, all assets are 
worth q per unit of capital, and therefore the long-run fundamental value of merged company is:
q(K + K.) (6)
In contracts to financial markets influenced by behavioral biases, Shleifer and Vishny assume that 
managers are perfectly rational and perfectly informed. In model they know precisely the value of 
their own company and the value of potential merging partners. A further assumption is that 
managers maximize their own wealth given their personal investment horizons.
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Short-Run Value Effects of Acquisitions
The price paid (P) reflects the negotiating power of the parties involved. Contrary to Myers and 
Majluf (1984), Shleifer and Vishny make a further assumption that the market learns nothing about 
the method of payment. Furthermore, denying the information hypothesis they also assume that the 
offer does not reveal anything new about fundamentals of the merging companies beyond the 
perceived synergy (S).
Therefore, the short-run effects to target and acquirer are as follows:
Proposition 1. The immediate effect of the acquisition is:
S ( К + Ki) - K]Qi - KQ On the combined market value (7)
(P-Q)K The short-run target value (8)
(S-P)K + (S-Qi)K, The short-run bidder value (9)
Assuming that perceived synergy S exceeds S*, the market’s perception benefits the combined 
entity while some of the value of the more valuable company spills over the less valuable one. 
Effectively this is analogous with the boot-strapping game of P/E -ratios described by Brealey and 
Myers (1996 p. 921-922). In practice the target shareholders gain if P > Q and acquirer shareholders 
gain if P < S. Furthermore, if the perceived synergy (S) exceeds the current price of bidder capital 
(Ql) the bidder has an opportunity to revalue its capital upwards in the short-run by purchasing new 
assets.
Long-Run Value Effects of Acquisitions
Next, I will focus on the long-run effects proposed by the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model. 
Hereafter acquisitions financed by stock and cash are considered separately.




on the combined value of companies 
on the target value 





According to the assumption of the model, there are no long-term effects on company values. Since 
cash acquisitions are a zero-sum game, bidders should proceed only if they locate a target that is 
undervalued in fundamental terms. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) take the view that the hostile bust-up 
takeovers of 1980s support their theory about cash acquisitions.
A relevant example of cash acquisition from recent Finnish business history is the hostile takeover 
of multi-business corporation Partek Oyj by Kone Oyj in summer 2002. By spring 2004, Kone has 
divested all acquired business units outside of its original core business and its share price has 
soared over 40% from the pre-announcement price. That is despite the fact that the short-term 
market reaction to announcement was a drop of nearly 20%.
The last proposition of Shleifer and Vishny concerns the long-run effects of a stock acquisition.
Proposition 3. The long-run effect of stock acquisition is:
zero
qK ( P / S - 1 ) 
qK(1-P/S)
on the combined value of companies (13)
on the target value (14)
on the acquirer value (15)
Bidder gains when price paid (P) is lower than perceived synergy (S). Moreover, it is again a zero- 
sum game where the loss of the target is the gain of the bidder and vice versa.
The key insight of Proposition 3. is that there is an important difference between the effect of 
acquisition on the acquirer share’s intrinsic long-term value and the observed share price 
development. Assuming that the share was initially overpriced (Qi > q), the bidder firm’s long-term 
value without the acquisition (Ki(q - Qi)) would have been negative. Therefore, even when the 
long-term return of the acquirer is negative like in studies by Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Rau 
and Vermaelen (1998) the acquisition has been rational from the viewpoint of long-term 
shareholders who end up losing less if price paid (P) is less than market’s assessment of synergy 
(S). Furthermore, this creates difference between interests of short-term and long-term shareholders. 
When P < S but (S - P)K + (S - Qi)Ki<0, the initial price reaction is negative but in the long-run 
the shareholders benefit while the fall in the share price is smaller than what it would have been 
without the acquisition.
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2.4.2.2 What Makes the Target Agree to a Stock Merger?
In Shleifer and Vishny model, the combined long-run benefits are always zero. If Q < P < S, the 
target shareholders gain in the short-run by receiving premium over the announcement time share 
price but lose in the long-run if they hold on to the bidder shares they receive. Consequently the key 
question is that who would agree to be a target in such circumstances?
Shleifer and Vishny offer different managerial horizons (Stein 1988, 1989) as an explanation. They 
argue that targets in stock acquisitions are run by managers who wish to “sell out”. Even though the 
long-run effects of a stock merger with a more overvalued acquirer are negative for original target 
shareholders, a manager of a less overvalued target would be rational to agree to merge if the 
situation offers an opportunity for a personal cash-out while the share prices are still floated. 
Shleifer and Vishny state that family firms selling out to conglomerates in the 1960s and 
entrepreneurial firms selling out to Cisco and Intel in 1990s are good examples of target companies 
that fit in their model.
Alternatively they suggest that target managers are paid for to agree on the merger. This can be 
done either directly through severance pay or indirectly by offering them high management 
positions in the merged company. Hartzell et al. (2003) study benefits received by target company 
CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. Consistently with the Shleifer and Vishny analysis, 
they find that executives obtain wealth increases with a median of $4 to $5 million and a mean of 
$8 to $11 million. The regression estimates of Hartzell el al. further suggest that target shareholders 
receive lower acquisition premia in transactions that involve extraordinary personal treatment of the 
CEO.
The prediction of the model that acquirers use stock as medium of exchange when their share price 
is overvalued relative to fundamentals is consistent with Myers and Maj luf (1984), who show that 
firms issue stock only when it is overvalued.
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2.4.2.3 Conclusion and New Predictions
In addition to the favorable share price development, the perceived synergy is the key driver in 
Shleifer and Vishny model. With high enough perceived synergies the best strategy for long-term 
shareholders is to make acquisitions, since they benefit as long as S>P. Consequently, Shleifer and 
Vishny also call perceived synergy (S) “the lubricant that greases the wheels of the M&A process”.
According to Shleifer and Vishny, their model yields following untested predictions:
• Targets in cash acquisitions are undervalued relative to fundamentals in absolute terms
• Targets in stock acquisitions are undervalued relative to the bidders -> merger pace in 
industries and markets with large dispersion of valuations should be high
• Bidders in stock acquisitions should exhibit signs of overvaluation relative to the 
fundamentals: high insider sales, manipulation of accounting accruals and negative post­
formation results
• Bidders in stock acquisitions have either relatively longer horizons compared to targets 
horizons, or alternatively they pay off target managers to agree on stock merger.
Since I do not possess the material for estimating undervaluation in absolute terms my focus is in 
comparing the valuations of target and acquirer companies by using market-to-book -ratios. 
Empirical research process will be discussed further in chapters concerning research methodology 
and hypotheses development.
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2.4.3 Market Valuation and Merger Waves
Besides Shleifer and Vishny (2003), also Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) present a model of 
mergers and acquisitions in which the stock market valuation is a key driver. Their article focuses 
more on the overall valuation level of stock market and on the merger waves.
The key insight of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan model is that increased asymmetries of 
information between the target and the acquirer are the reason for increased use of stock as a 
medium of exchange during levels of high stock market valuations.
When bidders use stock as method of exchange the target has to consider the appropriateness of 
bidder valuation and thus encounters a valuation problem. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan argue 
that the valuation problem associated with stock financed acquisitions is more severe during periods 
of high stock market valuations.
According to Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, misvaluation has firm-specific and market-wide 
components. Furthermore, the bidder management is assumed to possess private information about 
the stand alone value of the bidder-company and potential synergies with the target company.
When considering the offer the target management and shareholders try to filter out market- and 
sector-wide misvaluation in order to make an accurate estimation about the synergies. Rhodes- 
Kropf and Viswanathan argue that during times of high market-wide overvaluation, the estimation 
error by target management is also high. Consequently, stock bids tend to be accepted more easily 
during bull markets. In other words, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan theory is based on the inability 
of the target firms to distinguish synergy for effects of firm-specific and market overvaluation.
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2.5 M/B -RATIO AND METHOD OF PAYMENT THEORIES
This section introduces different interpretations of market-to-book -ratio and presents alternative 
theories concerning method of payment in mergers and acquisitions.
2.5.1 Growth Interpretation of Market-to-Book -ratio
The conventional efficient markets approach argues that market-to-book (or Tobin’s q) measures 
firm’s growth opportunities. More precisely, Myers (1977) divides the market value of a firm into 
the present value of assets already in place and to the present value of future growth opportunities.
For example Lang, Stolz, and Walking (1989) define Tobin’s q as “an increasing function of the 
quality of a firm's current and anticipated projects under existing management” and use it as proxy 
for firm’s growth opportunities. Moreover, Servaes (1991) emphasizes Tobin’s q as a measure of 
managerial performance.
If market-to-book can be used as a proxy for efficient use of resources, it can be stated that the 
fundamental economic theory supports the suggestion that high market-to-book firms buy low 
market-to-book firms. This is simply due to the fact that the primary function of financial markets is 
to allocate resources in most efficient way.
2.5.2 Misvaluation Approach of Market-to-Book -Ratio
On the other hand, high market-to-book -ratios can be thought to indicate overvaluation. Many 
studies have found so called book-to-market (В/M) -anomalies. Already Rosenberg et al. (1985) 
showed that so called value stocks (high book-to-market -ratio) outperform the market when 
common risk factors are taken into account. Furthermore, in their recent study Chan and 
Lakonishok (2004) review value vs. growth investing and their evidence suggests that value 
investing still generates superior returns.
Supporting efficient market hypothesis, Fama and French (1996) argue that the premium associated 
with high book equity to market equity might be due to the risk of distress. On the contrary, 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) suggest that the relation between market-to-book -ratio 
and stock returns is evidence of market inefficiency created by investor overreaction. Also Chan
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and Lakonishok (2004) conclude their study by arguing that common measures of risk do not 
support the argument that higher returns of the low book-to-market (value) stocks are due to higher 
risk associated with the value stocks.
Hence, since low В/M (or high M/В) stocks underperform the market and there is no clear evidence 
about the risk factor they may present, it can be stated that in some instances market-to-book -ratio 
can be used also as a proxy for misvaluation.
2.5.3 Theories of Method of Payment in M&A
In addition to the misvaluation theories, there are also several theories regarding the choice over 
method of payment in mergers and acquisitions.
Risk sharing hypothesis is based on an article by Hansen (1987). The key insight is that if the target 
knows its value better than the bidder, using stock as method of payment forces the target to share 
any post-acquisition revaluation effects. Therefore in situations where information asymmetries are 
high, bidders are presumed to use stock. Hansen argues that information asymmetries and thus risk 
should grow with the relative size of the target compared to the bidder. Secondly, Hansen predicts 
that the target’s investment opportunities (i.e. market-to-book) are a good proxy for information 
asymmetries.
The investment opportunities hypothesis stems from Myers’s (1977) linking of investment 
opportunities with borrowing activity. According to Myers, the presence of risky debt may in some 
circumstances lead to underinvestment, in case exercising real investment option would result in 
wealth transfers from shareholders to debt holders. Consequently, firms whose value depends more 
on growth opportunities (high market-to-book companies) are more likely to use equity financing 
instead of debt financing. Myers and Majluf (1984) further argue that managers with growth 
opportunities prefer to raise capital through equity issues in order to maintain financial flexibility 
necessary to finance the growth projects in the future. Since a stock financed merger can also be 
considered as an equity issue (Fama 1998), it would be beneficial for a high market-to-book 
company to finance corporate acquisitions with issuing stock.
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Cash availability hypothesis is based on Myers’s (1984) pecking order of finance which says that 
managers primarily want to use internal cash flows for new investments. Also Jensen’s (1986) free 
cash-flow hypothesis supports use of excess cash as medium of payment.
Furthermore, relative size proposition suggested by previous literature has proposed that the bigger 
the size of the target firm relative to the acquirer will lead to the acquirer more likely to use share 
financing (see e.g. Grullon et al., 1997).
It can be also speculated that cross-border acquisitions are more likely to be financed with cash 
than stock. Rationale behind the assumption is that for several reasons shareholders might prefer 
cash instead of holding an unfamiliar foreign share.
Firstly, the tax treatment of foreign and domestic shares may be different. For example the avoir 
fiscal taxation system currently under adjustment in Finland makes the dividend taxation of 
domestic holdings favorable compared to foreign holdings. Another argument is convenience: 
domestic shares can be always traded through domestic brokers but foreign shares may have to be 
traded through selected brokers and thus resulting possibly in higher trading and administration 
costs.
Also home bias in investments documented by Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Grinblatt and 
Kelohaiju (2001) may be a factor in choosing the method of payment. Furthermore, according to 
Baker et al. (2002) visibility proxied by analyst coverage is also associated with a decrease in the 
cost of equity capital. In addition, information asymmetries are also likely to be higher in foreign 
holdings due to different accounting and financial reporting standards in different countries. Also 
shareholder clienteles may be limited compared to domestic equity. For example some U.S. 
institutional investors have restricted ownership of shares that are not listed in the U.S.
Management control hypothesis by Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) states that managers 
are reluctant to use stock if doing so dilutes their ownership and affect their controlling of the 
company. However, due to data restrictions, this hypothesis can not be tested in this thesis.
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2.5.4 Summary of Method of Payment Implications to M/В -ratio
As said before, market-to-book -ratio has been associated with several financial phenomena such as 
intangible assets, growth opportunities, management quality, misvaluation, distress risk. However, 
from perspective of this study, the misvaluation interpretation of market-to-book is the only one that 
has clear implications to the choice over method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. If it can be 
shown that relatively high market-to-book -companies choose stock as method of payment, 
combining the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theory to the fact that high market-to-book -companies 
underperform the market, the result would indicate that market inefficiency has impact on the 
market for corporate control.
Table 6 below presents the implications that different theories concerning the choice over method of 
payment have to this thesis. An underlying assumption here is that market efficiency does not hold 
and market-to-book -ratio can be used to proxy market misvaluation under certain circumstances.
Table 6: Implications of Method of Payment Theories
Theory Key Author(s) Implications to this Thesis
Risk sharing hypothesis Hansen (1987)
High information asymmetries =
High target M/B -> Stock deals
Investment opportunities
hypothesis
Myers and Majluf (1984)
High investment opportunities =
high acquirer M/B -> Stock deals.
Cash availability
hypothesis
Myers (1984) and Jensen (1986)
Low acquirer leverage -> Cash
deals.
Relative size hypothesis Grullon et al. (1997)
The larger the target compared to
acquirer -> Stock deals
Cross-border hypothesis
Indirectly Coval and Moskowitz
(1999) & Grinblatt and
Kelohaiju (2001)




Harris and Raviv (1988) and
Stulz (1988)
Large acquirer management
shareholdings -> Cash deals
Misvaluation hypothesis Shleifer and Vishny (2003)
High acquirer M/B -> Stock deals,
Low Target M/B -> Cash deals
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3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN THE LITERATURE
The performance of mergers and acquisitions is a thoroughly researched area. Countless number of 
studies have examined the event returns of merger announcements, effects on post-merger 
accounting performance and the long-term share price development after the transaction. This 
chapter will present a summary of the relevant empirical findings by previous research. As stated 
also in the introduction of the Shleifer and Vishny article (2003), the past empirical evidence is 
widely consistent with the predictions of the stock market driven acquisitions theory.
3.1 ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS IN M&A
Consistently with the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theory, acquiring firm’s stock typically 
experiences a negative price reaction in stock-financed acquisitions. While this evidence is not 
completely unambiguous, majority of the research studying announcement period abnormal returns 
indicate that in stock acquisition the returns are either negative or do not significantly deviate from 
zero.
Travlos (1987) studies annual data from 1972 to 1981 by using event study methodology. He finds 
that the stock price reactions of bidding firms to the announcement of a takeover are related to the 
method of payment. The reaction is more negative for mergers paid with stock, and Travlos argues 
this is supportive for the hypothesis that a stock offer signals negative information about the value 
of bidding firms assets. Furthermore, analyzing 704 merger and tender offer bids between 1972 and 
1987 Servaes (1991) reports that both acquirer and total returns are lower in stock bids compared to 
cash bids.
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) study 921 successful U.S. tender offers between 1958 and 1984. 
They find that cumulative abnormal return (CAR) was positive for the target and bidder combined 
for all subperiods and for the total period. They also find that acquirer CAR was positive for all 
other periods except for 1981-1984, which they argued was a consequence of new target defences, 
legislative changes (Williams Act) and increased competition.
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Andrade et al. (2001) study a sample of 3.688 completed mergers place between 1973 and 1998. 
The average abnormal return for targets using a 3-day window [-1, +1] is 16%, and using a longer 
window beginning 20 days before the announcement and ending at the close of the merger [-20, 
Close] target’s gain is on average 23.8%. Results are statistically significant at 1% level. Abnormal 
returns to acquirers are -0.7% and -3.8% respectively, but neither is statistically significant. Results 
for target and acquirer combined are 1.8% using 3-day window and 1.9% using the longer window, 
with the former being statistically significant at 5% confidence level.
More interestingly, Andrade et al. (2001) find that method of payment has impact on the 
announcement period returns. As the following summary table illustrates, acquirer 3-day abnormal 
return is statistically significantly 1.5% negative, while in transactions financed completely without 
stock return is 0.4% positive.
Table 7: Announcement Period Abnormal Returns for Sub-Samples, 1973-1998
Stock No Stock Large Targets
Combined
[-1.+1] 0.6% 3.6% 3.0%a
[-20, Close] -0.6% 5.3% 6.3%
Target
[-1.+1] 13.0%a 20.1% 13.5%a
[-20, Close] 20.8%a 27.8% 21.6%a
Acquirer
[-1.+1] -1.5%a 0.4% -1.5%
[-20, Close] -6.3% -0.2% -3.2%
Number of observations 2,194 1,494 511
Note: Statistical significance at 5 percent level is denoted bya
Source: Andrade et al. (2001) Table 4. p. 112.
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Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) study firms that make five or more acquisitions using a 
sample of 3.135 acquisitions between 1990 and 2000. The underlying idea of the study is that since 
acquirer characteristics are controlled for, identical, any variation in the method of payment or in 
the returns must be due to characteristics of the target and the bid. Fuller et al. find that when 
bidders acquire public targets using stock as method of payment, the abnormal return using 5-day 
window around the announcement date is -1.86% at 5% confidence level, thus supporting the 
overvaluation hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Moreover, Fuller et al. argue that positive 
abnormal returns from acquiring a private firm or a subsidiary reflects liquidity discount.
Recently, Yook (2003) studies the role of method of payment in acquisition returns using Standard 
and Poor’s debt rating reviews. From a sample between 1985 and 1996, he also finds that cash 
acquirer returns are more favorable compared to returns of stock acquirers. However, Yook states 
stock and cash acquisitions have different sources of value creation. Benefit of debt seems to be the 
main source in cash acquisitions while synergy effects are the key in stock acquisitions. Yook 
further argues that while his results indicate that stock is used in most unsuccessful acquisitions, 
there is no convincing evidence that cash is used in all good acquisitions.
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3.2 POST-MERGER PERFORMANCE
Post-merger performance studies have been conducted from both share price and accounting data. 
The evidence from post-merger accounting studies is mixed, while clear majority of post-merger 
share price studies indicates negatively abnormal performance especially in stock financed mergers. 
This is also consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny theory.
3.2.1 Accounting Studies
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) study the post-merger accounting performance of nearly 6.000 
corporate mergers between 1950 and 1977 using Federal Trade Commission line of business data. 
They find that the operating performance of the average merger is followed by deteriorating profit 
performance. Also Herman and Lowenstein (1988) arrive at the conclusion that there are no 
improvements in operating performance after takeovers.
On the contrary, Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) examine post-acquisition performance from an 
accounting perspective. Using a sample of 50 largest mergers in United States between 1979 and 
mid-1984, they find that compared to an industry benchmark the merged firms show significant 
improvement in asset productivity. Improvements in post-merger cash flows provide support for the 
synergy theories of mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, they find evidence supporting stock 
market efficiency theory. In their study the abnormal event returns at merger announcement 
correlates positively with the increases in cash flows following mergers.
3.2.2 Share Price Studies
Agrawal et al. (1992) study post-merger share price performance using a sample of 937 mergers and 
227 tender offers consisting of NYSE acquirers and NYSE/AMEX targets between years 1955 and 
1987. They find that stockholders of acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant loss of about 
10% over the five-year post-merger period. More importantly, Agrawal et al. note that in both 
tender offers and mergers, post-acquisitions underperformance is more severe for stock financed 
acquisitions compared to cash-financed deals.
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Studying 399 U.S. takeovers between 1975 and 1984 Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) find that 
post-merger share price performance is sensitive to the benchmark employed. They argue that 
previous findings of poor performance are likely due to benchmark errors rather than mispricing.
Loughran and Vijh (1997) use a sample consisting of 947 acquisitions between 1970 and 1989. 
They find that during a five-year period following the acquisition, the firms that complete mergers 
financed with stock issue earn statistically significant abnormal returns. On average the abnormal 
return is —25.0 percent for stock financed mergers whereas cash tender offers earn positive excess 
returns of 61.7 percent during the same period of time. This evidence supports the propositions by 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) that share prices of stock bidders are overvalued. For mergers and 
tender offers combined, cash transactions earn positive average abnormal return of 18.5% during 
the five-year post-acquisition period, while all stock financed transactions underperform by -24.2%.
The result of Loughran and Vijh (1997) is criticized by Fama (1998). Fama argues that since 
negative abnormal returns are associated with stock mergers, the phenomenon is actually an equity 
offering anomaly in disguise. Fama further criticizes studies of equity offerings anomalies on 
methodological grounds, and concludes by stating that anomalies are chance results and therefore 
they support the efficient market hypothesis.
Also Rau and Vermaelen (1998) study three-year post-merger performance of a sample of 2823 
mergers and 316 tender offers announced between 1980 and 1991 using book-to-market and size 
corrections recommended in the literature (Fama and French 1993). In their sample, mergers 
underperform equally weighted control portfolio by statistically significant 4.04% during a 36- 
month window, while tender offers outperform control portfolios by statistically significant 8.85%. 
Interestingly, the average merger in their sample is over 50% financed by stock, while on average 
only 7% of tender offer value is paid by stock. Rau and Vermaelen also show that much of the 
underperformance by acquiring firms is caused by high market-to-book firms. They suggest that 
this is caused by the market’s overextrapolation of “glamour” firms past earnings in assessing the 
desirability of the acquisition. This overextrapolation can be interpreted as the market’s assessment 
of synergies, i.e. the (S) in Shleifer and Vishny Model.
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3.3 DIRECT EVIDENCE OF STOCK MARKET EFFECTS
Due to the fact that the theories by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2003) are very recently published, only a limited number of empirical studies have directly tested 
their hypotheses.
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2003) test the theory of Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswananthan (2003) by decomposing market-to-book -ratios into firm-specific, sector-wide and 
long-term components. They find that especially stock financed merger intensity increases during 
times of high stock market valuations. Furthermore, to the extent that their firm-specific and sector­
wide components of market-to-book -ratio capture misvaluation, they find strong support for the 
theories by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) stating that 
deviation from fundamental values can be a driver of mergers and acquisitions.
A recent working paper by Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (Dong et al. 2003) tests the 
hypothesis by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) that market misvaluation affects firms' takeover behavior. 
Dong et al. (2003) use pre-takeover book-to-price ratios as well as pre-takeover ratios of residual 
income model value to price as contemporaneous proxies for market misvaluation. They use a 
sample of 2922 successful and 810 unsuccessful acquisition bids taking place between years 1978 
and 2000 by firms listed in NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ exchanges.
In line with the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Dong et al. (2003) find that acquirer 
book-to-price -ratios (В/P) are higher than target ratios in both stock and cash acquisitions with 
evident statistical significance. Furthermore, targets in cash acquisitions have higher В/P -ratios 
compared to targets in stock acquisitions. Also acquirers have higher В/P -ratios in cash 
acquisitions thus indicating correlation with lower valuation levels and cash payment. Dong et al. 
find similar results also by using residual income model. В/P findings of Dong et al. (2003) are 
presented in Table 8 on the next page.
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Table 8: Mean Acquirer and Target В/P Ratios by Method of Payment 1978-2000
Method of
Payment




Cash 0.659 0.771 -0.112 -4.05 766
Stock 0.412 0.552 -0.140 -12.14 1246
Mixed 0.745 0.774 -0.028 -0.42 904
All 0.580 0.678 -0.098 -4.35 2916
Mean Difference of В/P Ratios
Cash - Stock 0.247 0.219
t-stat 11.75 8.10
Source: Dong et al. (2003) Table 2.
In order to avoid any time-variance, Dong et al. rank sample firms monthly to quintiles according to 
their В/P -ratios. The comparisons of the most highly valued quintile (1) and least highly valued 
quintile indicate that high В/P values of both target and acquirer are associated with cash payment 
whereas low В/P values are connected to stock payments thus further supporting the proposals of 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Table 9 below presents the quintile results of Dong et al.























1 518 0.148 18.3 53.9 575 0.140 19.3 54.1
2 680 0.400 24.4 48.5 734 0.348 23.8 46.2
3 691 0.608 28.7 40.8 729 0.524 25.4 44.4
4 678 0.862 27.6 37.2 736 0.725 27.6 39.9
5 670 1.388 30.7 31.2 628 1.302 33.4 28.2
Difference
1-5
-1.24*** -12.4*** 22.6*** -1.162*** -14.1*** 25.9***
Source: Dong et al. (2003) Table 3, Panels A and C. *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level.
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To test the robustness of their univariate findings, Dong et al. perform logistic regressions relating 
bidder and target misvaluation to method of payment. They rank bidder and target В/P each month 
among all CRSP stocks and assign them a value between 1 and 100 and use industry control 
dummies defined by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999). Dong et al. find support for the hypotheses 
that target overvaluation is associated with stock payment as well as target undervaluation is 
associated with cash payment. Furthermore, also high bidder valuations are associated with stock 
payment as predicted by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Findings of Dong et al. are presented in the 
Table 10 below.
Table 10: Logistic Regressions Explaining Method of Payment
Cash Stock
Target B/P 0.009 -0.020
p-value 0.011 0.000




Log of Relative Size 0.417 -0.220
p-value 0.000 0.000




Sample Size 1513 1513
Pseudo R2 0.1790 0.2232
Source: Dong et al. (2003) Table 4.
To summarize, Dong et al. find that the misvaluation of bidders and targets has an effect on the 
method of payment chosen, the premia paid, and bidder and target announcement period stock 
returns. Dong et al. conclude by stating that their evidence is strongly supportive for the 
misvaluation hypothesis by Shleifer and Vishny (2003).
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A working paper by Ang and Cheng (2002) tests merger related misvaluations on a sample of over 
9.000 mergers between 1984 and 2001 using three different methodological approaches. Firstly, 
Ang and Cheng use a traditional P/В method by comparing the market-to-book of each merging 
company to the median market-to-book of corresponding industry. Other two methods are based on 
residual income models (RIM), first by using ex-ante analysts’ consensus estimations from I/B/E/S 
and secondly using ex-post results for three years following the mergers.
Using relative P/В method Ang et al. (2003) find that acquirers in cash acquisitions are -20.20% 
undervalued and bidders in stock acquisitions are 36.21% overvalued. Using RIM model based on 
earnings forecasts, the effect of target undervaluation disappears and overvaluation effect of stock 
bidders diminishes. According to their results, Ang et al. (2003) suggest that after taking pre-merger 
overvaluation into account, the original acquirer’s shareholders do not lose. However, the long-term 
target shareholder that hold on to the shares of the original acquirer end up losing value.
Furthermore, a working paper by Pshisva and Suarez (2004) evaluates the earnings manipulation 
associated with bidders in stock acquisitions during the 1990s. Using data on 271 mergers in the 
1990s, Pshisva and Suarez find evidence that the accruals of stock acquirers are abnormally high 
during time prior to mergers while cash acquirers do not appear to manipulate accruals before 
acquisition announcements. Hence their findings support the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003).
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3.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF METHOD OF PAYMENT EFFECTS
A study by Andrade et al. (2001) shows that acquirer Q-value exceeds target Q-value in 66% of 
mergers in their sample of 4.256 mergers and acquisition between 1973 and 1998. This is consistent 
with the reallocative function of financial markets assuming that growth opportunity interpretation 
of Q-value (or M/B-ratio) holds.
The most detailed study about the motives underlying the choice over method of payment has been 
done by Martin (1996), who studies a sample covering 846 US acquisitions for the period from 
1979 to 1988 by applying the traditional market model to calculate the mean values of data 
variables which are grouped by the three payment methods. His study includes several alternative 
hypotheses for choosing stock as the method of payment presented in the theoretical part of this 
study.
Martin’s empirical findings support the notion that the higher the acquirer's market-to-book -ratio 
(Tobin’s q), the more likely the acquirer is to use stock to finance an acquisition. In his study Martin 
controls for the following deal characteristics: buyer institutional ownership, cash holdings, 
leverage and profits divided by deal value, a tender offer indicator and several business cycle 
variables. Furthermore, Martin finds that the likelihood of stock financing increases with higher 
preacquisition market and acquiring firm stock returns.
In order to illustrate the risk-sharing hypothesis Martin matches 86 targets and acquirers between 
1978 and 1988. Table 11 on the next page shows that 68% of high-acquirer-q/high-target-q 
acquisitions are financed by stock, while only 16% of those are financed by cash. While the table 
supports the risk sharing hypothesis by Hansen (1987), the results fit also the predictions of the 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theory since they predict that in overvalued markets bidders acquire less 
overvalued targets using stock as method of payment.
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Table 11: Q-ratios of Acquiring and Target Companies 1978-1988
Acquiring
Firm Q-ratio
Financing type Target firm Q-ratio
Low High Total
Stock 26% 45% 34%
Cash 42% 36% 40%
Low
Mixed 32% 18% 26%
N 31 22 53
Stock 21% 68% 48%
Cash 43% 16% 27%
High
Mixed 36% 16% 24%
N 14 19 33
Stock 24% 56% 40%
Cash 42% 27% 35%
Total
Mixed 33% 17% 26%
N 45 41 86
* Source: Martin (1996) Table III p. 1242
A study by Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) compares mergers and acquisitions to direct 
investments in new capital. Jovanovic and Rousseau find that a firm's merger and acquisition 
investment rate responds to its Q more - by a factor of 2.6 - than its direct investment does and 
therefore find support for the reallocative function of capital markets. They also find support for the 
free-cash flow hypothesis by Jensen (1986), but state that it explains only a small fraction of merger 
activity. However, while the Q-theory appears to be is clearly applicable to mergers and 
acquisitions, it does not explain the choice of method of payment.
Previous studies on the impact of the relative size of target to bidder on payment methods are not 
consistently confirmed. It is viewed by some researchers that the bigger the size of the target firm 
will lead to the acquirer more likely to use share financing in M&A deals. However in some other 
studies, this hypothesis has been rejected. Grullon et al. (1997) find support for the size hypothesis 
in their study of U.S. bank mergers, but in their more extensive studies Martin (1996) and Ghosh 
and Ruland (1998) do not find significant relation between target size and method of payment.
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Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) study a sample of 209 U.S. acquisitions between the years 1981 
and 1983 to investigate whether there is a relationship between insider ownership and method of 
payment. They find that in cash financed transactions the top five managers of the firm hold about 
11% of the company’s shares, while for in stock financed deals less than 7% of shares are held by 
top management. The result indicates that managers with relatively higher share holdings prefer to 
finance acquisitions with cash instead of stocks. To explain this phenomenon, Amihud et al. point 
out that the reason for the use of cash rather than stock is that the managers do not want to increase 
the risk of losing control after the acquisitions.
Ghosh and Ruland (1998) and Faccio and Masulis (2004) find that corporate governance issues 
affect the choice over method of payment as predicted by control hypothesis - i.e..they find that the 
large management equity holdings increase probability of cash payment.
Also interestingly, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989) find that total stock market gains are highest 
when bidder has high Tobin’s q and target has a low Tobin’s q. However, Lang et al. do not control 
for method of payment and therefore it could be interpreted that both Shleifer and Vishny theory 
and capital market’s reallocation theory could hold in their sample.
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4 DATA AND HYPOTHESES
4.1 CONSTRUCTION OF THE FINAL SAMPLE
The sample of mergers and acquisitions was collected from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
Mergers and Acquisitions -database. Due to potential selection and survivorship bias problems 
specified later in this chapter, the sample is limited to acquisitions between years 1.1.1998 - 
31.12.2003. Furthermore, only transactions exceeding 10 million dollars in value between listed 
companies were included in the sample. Finally, data for market-to-book ratio for either target or 
acquiring company was required to be available from Thomson Financial Worldscope -database. 
Table 12 below enlightens construction of the final sample stage by stage.
Table 12: Description of the Sample Selection
Number of deals Description of Criteria
213 275 Date announced: 1.1.1998 to 31.12.2003
39388 Target is a publicly listed company
23730 Acquirer Is a publicly listed company
12984 Deal value must exceed 10 million USD
4550 Percent of shares owned after transaction over 50%
3717 Percent of shares acquired at least 50%
3242 Non-negative Market-to-book ratio available for either target or 
acquirer3
3242 Sample used in Descriptive Statistics
1622 All variable data available from Worldscope Database
1622 Sample used in the Logistic Regression Analysis
3 Market-to-book -ratio’s can be extremely high in case the book value of equity is minimal due to e.g. holding 
company structure or some other reason. Therefore, I have chosen to cut the outlier of market-to-book —ratios of over 
fifty (50). Furthermore, due to data inconsistencies or other peculiarities market-to-book —ratios for some companies 
were negative in the initial sample. Since negative values of market-to-book do not make any economic sense, I have 
removed them from the sample.
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4.1.1 Matching Between Databases
The SDC provides market-to-book ratios for target companies, but this data for bidding companies 
had to be acquired from Thomson Financial Worldscope -database. Acquiring companies were 
matched to accounting and share price data using trading code -tickers provided by SDC database. 
However, the quote symbols provided by SDC are not complete in sense that they do not include 
the corresponding stock exchange codes required by Thomson Financial to return data from each 
specific company from international sample. Therefore, I was compelled to manually double check 
46% of the pre-Worldscope matched sample.
4.1.2 Trading Ticker Incomplete
A typical example of ticker problem is trading code PFE, which returns the data of U.S. based 
pharmaceutical company Pfizer Ltd. On the other hand, Portuguese company Papelaria Fernandes 
SA’s quote symbol is PFE-LB, of which SDC provides only the first part (PFE). When there exists 
multiple quote symbols with identical company component, Thomson Financial either returns the 
data of U.S. based company or the text “#N/A”.
4.1.3 Companies Change Names
Another challenge to the sample quality is caused by the facts that companies often change names 
and/or quote symbols after merger or an acquisition. An illustrative Finnish example of name 
change roulette is manufacturing company Wärtsilä Oyj. In the aftermath corporate restructuring 
process caused by financial distress of its maritime unit, Wärtsilä Oy changed its name to Metra Oy 
in 1990. After only a decade under new brand and again following business-reorganizing process, 
Metra Oyj changed its name back to Wärtsilä Oyj in the fall of year 2000. During these changes, the 
stock quote symbol was changed each time with the corporate name change.
4.1.4 Companies Change Trading Codes
Sometimes companies change trading codes for some other reason than corporate name change. For 
example Finnish insurance company Pohjola Oyj that previously had multiple classed of shares 
changed over to one share series in May 2003. As a result, Pohj ola’s main trading code changed 
from POHVD-HE to POH1V-HE.
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4.1.5 Manual Double-Checking
In order to secure that each company would receive correct data from the database, I manually 
double-checked the sample and added missing stock exchange codes to corresponding company 
quote symbols. To search the names of corporations I used Internet searches4 and a specific Internet 
page that includes corporate name and structure changes associated with mergers and acquisitions5. 
Also the informative business descriptions of each company in Thomson Financial were useful 
while they often provide information about corporate name changes.
I also made some important observations while manually going through the data. First notice was 
that holding company structures might cause some noise to the data while financial data in the 
Worldscope may be under different code than what is provided by SDC. More importantly, it 
appeared that distinctively large number of Nasdaq -listed acquirers during late nineties had ceased 
to exist or they had been further acquired and thus in many cases there were no share price nor 
accounting data available for there companies. This creates a potential difficulty for this particular 
study while intuitively especially Nasdaq -listed technology companies potentially had extremely 
high valuations during the hot stock market period.
4.1.6 Tradeoff between Data Quality and Scope
SDC includes international transactions starting from year 1984. By using a longer time period the 
results would be more robust since the sample size would be larger. However, the problems with 
matching data between SDC and Worldscope appeared to be directly related to the time that has 
passed since the announcement of the acquisition, which might cause survivorship bias to the 
sample. Therefore, the data set is limited to contain the up and down swing of the stock market 





The objective of this thesis is to find out whether stock market valuation levels6 affect acquirer’s 
choice of method of payment in acquisitions. Valuation levels for individual firms are proxied by 
market-to-book -ratios and periods of high overall stock market valuations are proxied by 
combining ‘The Fed Model’ and a model utilizing aggregate P/E -ratios of Standard & Poor’s 500 
Composite Stock Price Index7. The research questions presented in introduction are repeated below:
Research question 1: Does the share price valuation level proxied by M/В -ratio affect acquirer’s 
choice over method of payment in mergers and acquisitions?
Research question 2: Does period of high overall stock market valuation create conditions under 
which high M/В firms are able to better take advantage of their high valuations through stock 
financed acquisitions?
As stated earlier in the introduction, the research questions and accordingly also the hypotheses of 
this study are primarily based on the theoretical work of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes- 
Kropf and Viswanathan (2003). Shleifer and Vishny predict that managers of overvalued companies 
seek to capitalize on their highly valued acquisition currency before the market recognizes 
misvaluation and their share price plunges.
Moreover, since В/M -anomalies have persisted in the finance research, it may be presumed that 
the relation of a firms market value to its book value contain some information and therefore used 
to proxy possible misvaluation. Hence, in all hypotheses regarding misevaluation, it is proxied by 
industry adjusted market-to-book -ratio of the particular company.
Furthermore, use of overvalued stock as acquisition currency may be more common during periods 
of high stock market valuations since it may be more difficult to determine misvaluation during 
those times, as predicted by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan.
6 Dong et al. (2003) use term ‘stock market misvaluation’ instead of valuation levels
7 Defining of periods of high stock market valuations will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.3
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4.2.1 Hypotheses about Firm-Specific Market-to-Book -Ratios
First hypothesis stems from idea that market for corporate control functions by reallocating capital 
towards higher growth expectations. Intuitively it would be rational that firms with high growth 
opportunities purchase firms with low growth opportunities. Since market-to-book -ratio is often 
used as a proxy for growth opportunities, it is predictable that acquirers experience higher market- 
to-book -ratios compared to targets. This is also in-line with the predictions of Q-Theory 
(Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002) stating that a firm’s merger and acquisition investment rate should 
rise with q-ratio.
Hypothesis 1: Both stock and cash bidders are on average higher valued than targets.
Furthermore, building on the underinvestment theory by Myers’s (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984) 
argue that companies with growth opportunities prefer to raise capital through equity issues in order 
to maintain financial flexibility. Since choice over method of payment in mergers and acquisitions 
can also been seen as a choice between issuing debt and equity, high market-to-book companies are 
more likely to use stock as method of payment.
More importantly for this thesis, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) prediction about bidders is that in 
stock acquisitions they should exhibit signs of overvaluation. Therefore, the key hypothesis of this 
formulated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Acquirers with high equity valuations measured by industry adjusted
market-to-book -ratios choose stock as the method of payment in mergers 
and acquisitions.
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4.2.2 Hypotheses about the General Stock Market Effects
According to the theory by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) mergers and acquisitions 
activity should increase during periods of high stock market valuations. Furthermore, during times 
of high valuations, there should be relatively more stock financed acquisitions. Consequently, 
following hypotheses are tested:
Hypothesis 3: Favorable general Stock market valuation level increases the possibility
for a stock bid.
Hypothesis 4: Acquirers with high market-to-book -ratio choose stock as medium of
payment more often during periods of favorable overall stock market 
valuation levels.
4.2.3 Control Hypotheses
Previous research has found several indications about the determinants of method of payment in 
mergers and acquisitions8. Even though most of them are out of the scope of this study, I will 
include some interesting hypotheses testable in the logit regression analysis.
As stated already in the theory review, home bias is sometimes a factor in financial decision 
making. Therefore, it can be speculated that cross-border acquisitions are more likely to be financed 
with cash than stock. Rationale behind the assumption is that shareholders might prefer cash instead 
of holding an unfamiliar foreign share.
Hypothesis 5: Cross-border acquirers prefer cash as method of payment.
Moreover, since equity financing is the relative size hypothesis by Grullon et al. (1997) is also 
tested:
Hypothesis 6: Large targets are acquired rather by stock compared to cash.
8 See Chapter 2.5 and Table 6 for alternative hypotheses about the choice over method of payment
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Furthermore, the cash availability hypothesis by Myers (1984) and Jensen (1986) calls for testing 
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7: Low acquirer leverage is associated with cash financing.
Also several other hypotheses could be developed from both theories concerning misvaluation and 
theories regarding other motives for choosing particular method of financing in mergers and 
acquisitions. However, due to the limitations in data items in the current sample, I limit this study to 
testing of the seven hypotheses summarized in Table 13 below. Table 13 also enlightens the testable 
implications of the hypotheses.
Table 13: Summary Table of the Hypotheses and their Testable Implications
# Hypotheses Testable t-Test Implications
Implications to Logit 
Regression Model
HI Both stock and cash bidders are on average higher valued than targets
Acquirer MZB > 
Target MZB -
H2
Acquirers with high equity valuations 
measured by industry adjusted market- 
to-book -ratios choose stock as the 
method of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions
Stock Acquirer MZB 
> Cash Acquirer M/B
Positive correlation 
between acquirer M/В and 
stock payment
H3
Favorable general stock market 




between overall stock 
market valuation and stock 
payment
H4
Acquirers with high market-to-book - 
ratio choose stock as medium of 
payment more often during periods of 




acquirer M/В and stock 
payment increases during 
periods of high stock 
market valuations
H5 Cross-border acquirers prefer cash as method of payment -
Negative correlation 
between cross-border deals 
and stock payment
H6 Large targets are acquired rather by stock than cash -
Positive correlation 
between target size and 
stock payment
H7 Low acquirer leverage is associated with cash financing -
Positive correlation 
between acquirer leverage 
and stock payment
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4.3 DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
This section will present the variables that are used in the logistic regression analysis. Variable 
definitions and data sources are summarized on Table 16 at the end of this section.
4.3.1 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable used in logit regressions is a binary variable indicating whether a merger 
transactions is financed entirely with stock or not. Hence, the dependent variable used in the logit 
regressions is as follows:
ALL STOCK: A binary variable indicating a pure stock deal. Data concerning method of 
payment in sample transactions is acquired from the SDC Database.
y¡ (Stock 100) = (1) if payment is 100% stock; if payment is less, zero (0)
4.3.2 Explanatory Variables
Independent variables are presented in the following text. The first group of independent variables 
consists of acquirer and target characteristics.
It has been shown in many studies that the abnormal returns associated with an acquisition may start 
several weeks prior to the event. Therefore I use one month ‘buffer’ in order to avoid any pre­
announcement share price drifts resulting from news leakages before the official disclosure 
moment. Consequently the market-to-book -ratios for targets and acquirers are calculated from the 
share price one month prior to announcement and latest available full year financials.
Moreover, weighted average industry market-to-book -ratio required for generating following two 
variables is calculated from the sample companies in the following way9.
9 Since the industry averages are calculated from a sample of companies involved in mergers and acquisitions, the 
values are obviously subject to a selection bias and therefore should not be used in other occasions. However, a sample 
of 4956 companies provides for a reasonably solid benchmark of industry estimates for the purpose if this study.
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• 1773 observations of acquirer pre-acquisition five year average market-to-book -ratios are 
weighted with corresponding acquirer enterprise values.
• The remaining observations of acquirer market-to-book ratios one month preceding the 
acquisition (781) that do not have data for calculation of a five-year average, are weighted 
with corresponding acquirer enterprise values.
• 2402 observations of target market-to-book ratios one month preceding the acquisition are 
weighted with corresponding target enterprise values.
Table 14 below presents the sample used for estimating the weighted average market-to-book - 
ratios for each industry defined by 1-digit SIC Codes10.
Table 14: Sample used for Estimating the Industry Average Market-to-Book -ratios
Acquirer five year pre-acquisition average M/B 1773
Acquirer M/В one month before announcement 781
Target M/В one month before announcement 2402
Total 4956
Five-year averages of acquirer M/В are used in order to mitigate some of the problematic time- 
variance and supplemented by using target and acquirer M/В ratios with the intention of achieving 
as wide sample as possible with the limited data available. This rather peculiar technique of 
estimating industry averages yields following results presented in Table 15 below.
Table 15: Enterprise Value Weighted Average Market-to-Book -ratios in Different Industries
SIC1 SIC2 SIC3 SIC4 SIC5 SIC6 SIC7 SIC8 SIC9
Weighted




2,35 3,93 3,92 4,12 2,94 2,06 6,23 5,23 3,90
averages 0,84 3,33 4,38 3,57 1,48 0,29 6,58 1,59 1,16
Observations 382 636 1009 403 313 1320 765 138 2
10 Detailed information about the industries by one- and two-digit SIC Codes is presented in Appendix 2
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In each industry weighted averages appear to be higher than unweighted averages, which indicate 
that larger companies have higher M/В ratios compared to small companies. After explaining the 
weighting average procedure, we have the main explanatory variables:
ACQUIRER M/В LESS AVERAGE INDUSTRY M/В: Acquirer's market-to-book value one 
month prior to announcement less corresponding average industry market-to-book value. This 
is a continuous variable.
Rationality of the previous variable stems from the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) prediction that 
managers use stock as method of payment when it is overvalued. If the tests show that stock 
financing is correlated with acquirer market-to-book -ratios that exceed industry averages, it 
implies that managers consider the valuation level of their share when deciding about method of 
payment.
TARGET M/В LESS AVERAGE INDUSTRY M/В: Target's market-to-book value one 
month prior to announcement less corresponding average industry market-to-book value. This 
is also a continuous variable.
Next I introduce variables necessary for testing the implications of the Rhodes-Kropf - 
Viswanathan Theory:
PERIOD OF HIGH STOCK MARKET VALUATION: A calendar month is defined as period 
of high stock market valuations using a method based on two separate models further 
explained in Chapter 5.3. This variable is binary.
x; (BullMkt) = (1) if month of deal announcement is defined as period of high stock market 
valuations; if not value is zero (0)
PERIOD OF LOW STOCK MARKET VALUATION: A calendar month is defined as period 
of low stock market valuations using a similar method as above. This is also a binary variable:
x, (BearMkt) = (1) if month of deal announcement is defined as period of low stock market 
valuations; if not value is zero (0)
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Furthermore, in order to be able to test the control hypotheses, three variables regarding cross- 
border transactions, target size and acquirer leverage are introduced:
CROSS-BORDER transaction is an acquisition in which the acquirer and target company are 
domiciled in different countries. The variable is binary and it is defined as follows:
x¡ (CrossBor) = one (1) if the deal is a cross-border transaction; if not then value is zero (0)
ACQUIRER LEVERAGE RATIO: This ratio is the total debt percentage of total assets, and it 
is a continuous variable.
LOG OF TARGET SIZE: This continuous variable is the natural logarithm of the target’s 
enterprise value in USD as reported by the SDC Database.
Moreover, I use three different groups of control variables to control for the industry effects 
influencing the choice of method of payment in mergers and acquisitions.
CROSS-INDUSTRY deals are transactions in which the acquirer and target company have 
different 1-digit SIC Codes. This is a dummy variable and it is defined as follows:
x; (Crosslnd) = one (1) if the deal is a cross-industry transaction; if not then value is zero (0)
ACQUIRER INDUSTRY DUMMIES are nine identical dummy variables indicating the 1- 
digit SIC code of the acquiring company. Further industry definitions are presented in the 
Appedix. An example of an industry indicating 1-digit SIC Code value 1 is presented below:
Xi (AcqSICl) = one (1) if the acquirer’s 1-digit SIC Code is 1; if not then value is zero (0)
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One of the key elements in this study is the definition of periods of high stock market valuation 
levels. Due to the fact that the classifications are based on methods relating only to U.S. stock 
market data, it is necessary to include a variable categorizing whether bidder is domiciled in the 
United States or not.
ACQUIRER DOMICILE is a dummy variable indicating whether the acquiring company is 
domiciled in the United States:
x; (Usdeal) = one (1) if the acquirer is a U.S. based company; if not then value is zero (0) 
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This chapter briefly introduces the statistical methodology and a procedure of defining periods of 
high and low stock market valuations. The statistical methods used in the thesis include logit 
regression model and independent sample t-tests.
5.1 INDEPENDENT SAMPLE T-TESTS
I use common two tailed t-test to compare the means of market-to-book ratios of stock financed 
mergers and cash financed mergers. The tests are performed as described in Lehtonen’s book (1998, 
pp. 68-75).
5.2 LOGIT REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Logit regression is used to explain the binary choice of method of payment. This section is mostly 
based on Chapter 11 in Dougherty’s (2002) book titled Introduction to Econometrics.
The key question in this thesis is whether market-to-book -ratio and its pre-merger development 
affect bidder’s choice of method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. Since the dependent 
variable - method of payment - is defined as either cash or stock, the question comes down to 
binary choice between those two and the potential factors that contribute to the choice.
When applied to binary choice, commonly used linear probability models have some serious defects 
concerning disturbance term and nonsense probability estimates. Since the distribution of the 
disturbance term is neither continuous nor normal, the model can cause heteroscedasticity. 
Furthermore, when used for estimation of binary choice the linear regression can in some occasions 
also violate meaningful boundaries of probability, i.e. the probabilities can be over one or below 
zero (Dougherty 2002). Therefore, I use logistic regression to estimate the probability of 
occurrence of stock payment.
The assumptions of logistic regression are explained in the following text. The model assumes к 
independent observations уьУ2,.--->Ук and that the i-th observation can be treated as a realization of 
a random dependent variable Y¡ which has a binomial distribution:
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Y¡ = Bin (пьрО (16)
where the denominator n¡ is binomial and the probability is p¡. Furthermore, it is supposed that in 
logistic regression the logit of the underlying probability (pi) is a linear function of the predictors:
logit (pi) = ßi + ß2Xi (17)
Furthermore, the relationship between the logit (pO and the odds ratio produced by a logistic 
function is written as follows:
logit (pi) = log(—^—) = log(odds) 
Pi~ 1
(18)
In logit estimation the probability of the occurrence on an event is determined by the following 
function:
Pi=nZi) = \ + e~
(19)
where Z¡ is a linear function of explanatory variables:
Z,. = /?, +ß2Xl+ß3X2 + ...+ ßjX, (20)
As Z tends to infinity, e'z tends to 0 and p¡ has upper bound of 1, and as Z tends to minus infinity e'z 
tends to infinity resulting in p¡ having a lower bound of zero. Moreover, it should be noted that 
contrary to the linear regression model, in logistic framework the predictions have effects both on 
the mean and the variance of observations. The mean and variance for Y¡ are presented as follows:
ад) = А=и,А (21)
and
var(F¡ ) = af =n¡P¡(\-P¡) (22)
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In logistic regression, the preferred method for estimation is so called maximum likelihood 
estimation. The log-likelihood function used in the estimation is written as follows:
logL(ß) = £{У¡ loë(Pi) + (я, - Yi)log(l-Pi)} (23)
where p¡ depends on covariates Xi and a vector of parameters ß; through the logit transformation of 
the equation 17. The distribution of a logistic function is similar to the normal distribution except 
for fatter tails and a lower top.
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5.3 CLASSIFICATION OF STOCK MARKET VALUATION LEVELS
In a finance thesis, it is extremely risky to include a proxy periods of high market valuations in the 
testable model. This is simply because there is no consensus about academically approved 
definition for ‘bull markets’ i.e. periods of high market valuations. However, testing of hypotheses 
based on the theory by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) calls for such a classification.
5.3.1 Approaches in Relevant Literature
While there is no agreement about a feasible proxy for market valuation levels, the recent literature 
includes several ways of classifying stock market conditions. Testing the R&V model, Rhodes- 
Kropf, Viswanathan and Robinson (2003) break M/В -ratio into firm-specific, sector-wide and 
market-wide components, and therefore obtain periods of high valuations within specific industries 
and whole market from their model.
However, since this thesis is not built on decomposition of M/В -ratios, the definition of high 
overall stock market valuations has to be based on other arguments. One solution is to use so called 
‘Fed Model’ often quoted in the financial media11. It states that the market is fairly valued when the 
rate of long-term treasury notes equals aggregate stock market earnings yield. The model stems 
from the fact that there appears to be strong empirical regularity between the yields. For example, 
there appears to be strong positive correlation in the earnings yield of Dow Jones Industrial Average 
and 10 Year Treasury Note rate, as noted by Ritter (2002, p. 164, Figure II).
The relationship between common stock and bond valuations was set forth already by Benjamin 
Graham and David Dodd in their famous book Security Analysis published in 1934 (Graham and 
Dodd 1951). Lander and Orphanides (1997) formalize Graham and Dodd’s observation by testing a 
trading rule that alternates between S&P 500 and cash. They build a model for one-month-ahead 
forecasts of S&P 500 returns, and using a sample period of 1984-1996 they find support that their 
trading rule provides higher returns that are statistically significantly and also significantly lower 
variance. Also Shen (2003) finds support for the claim that market timing strategies based on the
11 The Fed Model is not officially endorsed by the Federal Reserve. It was dubbed ‘the Fed Model’ by Prudential 
Securities strategist Ed Yardeni after Fed’s Humphrey-Hawkins Report to Congress in July 22,1997 suggested the bank 
was following it: http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/1997/july/ReportSection2.htm.
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difference of E/P ratio of the S&P 500 and interest rates yield on ten-year Treasury notes beat the 
market index in terms of higher mean returns and lower variances - even after transaction costs.
Nonetheless, the theoretical grounds of the ‘Fed Model’ are not sound. Ritter (2002) points out that 
if most of the variation in nominal interest rates comes from changes in expected inflation rather 
than change in real rates, theoretically in an efficient market the correlation should be negative.
Another approach in defining levels of market valuation is to focus exclusively on the periods of 
high and low aggregate price-earnings ratio. In the first chapter of his book Irrational Exuberance, 
Shiller (2000) emphasizes the significance of the relationship of inflation-corrected S&P 500 
Composite Stock Price Index and inflation-corrected moving average of the preceding ten years 
S&P Composite earnings in determining whether the stock market is overvalued or not.
Another alternative of high, low and neutral classifications of S&P 500 is presented in a recent 
working paper by Bouwma, Fuller and Nain (2003). They divide each month as high (low) - 
valuation when it lies in the top (bottom) half of months with P/E ratios above (below) the past five- 
year average P/E.
5.3.2 Model for Classifying Stock Market Valuation Levels
I define the periods of high stock market valuations by using a combination of ‘the Fed Model’ and 
a simple estimation of aggregate P/E -ratio calculated as in Robert J. Shiller’s book Irrational 
Exuberance (Shiller 2000).
The data for inflation-corrected aggregate P/E ratios of S&P 500 Composite Stock Price Index is 
obtained from Shiller’s website12 and the monthly yields on actively traded issues of 10-year U.S. 
treasury notes adjusted to constant maturities are acquired from the Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release website13.
In his data set, Shiller smoothens quarterly reported earnings into monthly earnings as follows. 
March, June, September and December earnings are simply one third of the corresponding reporting 




previous months by 2 and second closest by 1 and dividing their sum by three. For example January 
earnings calculated as follows:
E(Jan)= 2 x E(Dec) + E(Mar) 
3
(24)
Furthermore, Shiller uses monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) to make inflation corrections to 
both S&P Composite Index and monthly earnings14. Monthly inflation-corrected price-earnings 
ratio (P/E 10) is calculated by the corresponding S&P 500 index value by ten years lagging average 
monthly earnings.
A calendar month is defined as period of normal stock market valuation unless both of the 
following criteria support either period of high valuation or period of low valuation. The full data 
table used to calculate the valuation levels is presented in Appendix 1.
1. ‘The Fed Model’
This model is based on the difference between S&P 500 aggregate earnings yield15 and 10-year 
Treasury Note rate. Firstly, I calculate monthly mean difference and standard deviation of the 
mean difference between the S&P earnings yield and 10-year Treasury note rate using the 
sample period of 1998-2003. On average treasury notes yield 1.96% more than S&P500 and the 
standard deviation on the difference is 1.48%.
To allow for reasonable fluctuations, I define market conditions as normal in case the monthly 
difference between the yields is within one standard deviation away from the mean difference. 
Therefore, I define overall stock market levels as follows:
(10-year Tr. note rate) - (S&P 500 yearnings yield) > 3.44% -> High stock market valuations 
(10-year Tr. note rate) - (S&P 500 yearnings yiéld) > 0.48% -> Low stock market valuations
This approach yields 15 high valuation, 17 low valuation and 40 normal valuation months.
14 In the data used in this thesis, the base date is 1/2000
15 S&P 500 aggregate earnings yield = 1 / (P/E10)
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2. Direct P/E Approach
The second model follows the approach of Irrational Exuberance (Shiller 2000). In the first 
chapter of the book Shiller discussed periods of stock market valuation levels in the twentieth 
century by comparing ten-year lagging aggregate price-earnings ratios (P/E 10) of S&P 500 
Index. Accordingly, I also calculate the mean and standard deviation of P/E 10 using monthly 
data between 1998 and 2003. The average price-earnings ratio (P/E 10) is 33.64 and the standard 
deviation 7.39.
As in the ‘Fed Model’ I allow for fluctuations of one standard deviation from the average 
P/E 10. Consequently, overall stock market levels in direct P/E model are defined as follows:
Monthly P/E 10 > 41.04 -> High stock market valuations 
Monthly P/E 10 > 26.25 -> Low stock market valuations
Direct P/E approach yields 18 high valuation, 17 low valuation and 37 normal valuation 
months.
By combining the ‘Fed Model’ and Direct P/E Approaches, the sample comprises of 14 months 
defined as periods of high overall stock market valuation, 17 months of low overall stock market 
valuation as presented in the Table 17 below16.
Table 17: Months Defined as High and Low Stock Market Valuation (1998-2003, N=72)
Overall Stock Market Valuation Levels
High__________________  ___________________ Low
Jun1999 Jan2000 Jul2002 Jan2003
Jul 1999 Feb2000 Aug2002 Feb2003
Aug1999 Mar2000 Sep2002 Mar2003
Sep1999 Apr2000 Oct 2002 Apr2003
NOV1999 May2000 NOV2002 May2003






16 Full data table is presented in the Appendix 1
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6 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND RESULTS
This chapter describes the features of the sample data including deal characteristics, distributions of 
deals by acquirer nationalities and distributions of deal in time. Furthermore, the chapter introduces 
empirical findings of both univariate tests and logistic regressions performed in this Thesis.
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
6.1.1 Distribution and Characteristics of Sample Transactions
Figure 1 below presents the monthly distribution and the cumulative percentage the of transaction 
value dining 1998-2003. As can be seen from the figure, the monthly transaction value during 
1998-2003 is unevenly distributed and it is clearly relatively more concentrated on the first three 
years of the sample compared to the latter three years. Interestingly, six of the top ten months 
ranked according to transaction value are also classified in this study as periods of high overall 
stock market valuations17. Moreover, the remaining four top ten months are classified as neutral and 
none of those is consequently classified as period of low stock market valuations.






Jan-98 Jul-98 Jan-99 Jul-99 Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03
17 See Chapter 5.3 and Table 14
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The deal size and characteristics are presented next. As Table 18 below shows, the average 
transaction value in the sample was 1547 million dollars, while the median value was only 175 
million dollars. Consequently an overwhelming majority (84.8%) of the deals are below the average 
transaction value. Distribution of the deals according to transaction value is illustrated in the Figure 
2 on the bottom of the page. Furthermore, the average size of an acquirer measured by enterprise 
value is 4.3 times larger than target while the median of acquirer enterprise value is 7.7 times 
greater than target.
Table 18: Size Characteristic of Deals, Acquirers and Targets (1998-2003, N = 3242)
Deal Value Acquirer Enterprise Value Target Enterprise Value
Average 1 547 15 567 3 614
Median 175 2 409 314
Min 10 0.21 0.84
Max 202 785 593 461 391 973
St.dev.
* in millions of dollars
7 083 42 348 19 629
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Moreover, this study employs logistic regression analysis which presumes binary distribution18. The 
rationale for using logit methodology is illustrated below in Figure 2, which presents the 
distribution of the sample by method of payment in terms of percentage stock used. As the figure 
shows, the distribution of method of payment is obviously not normal and it is very close to a pure 
binomial distribution. Hence, the use of logit regression model is clearly justified.
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Distribution of method of payment is further illustrated in Table 19 on the next page. The table 
presents a sensitivity analysis of the definition of stock and cash payment. It shows how number 
deals financed by stock, cash and mixed payment alternate as the definition of stock and cash 
payment19 is relaxed from 100% to 70%. Overall it can be stated that the share of mixed payment is 
almost negligible with a share of 7 to 14 percent depending on the definition of cash and stock 
payments.
18 See Equation 16 in Chapter 5.2
19 Cash payments includes cash and liabilities
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As can be seen from Table 19, pure cash deals account for 52% of the total number of deals while 
pure stock deals account for 33% of the deals. Compared to previous research on U.S. mergers and 
acquisitions the share of cash transactions is clearly higher. Andrade et al. (2001) report that of 
M&A transactions by U.S. firms between 1990 and 1998, 57.8% of deals are financed entirely with 
stock, whereas 70.9% of the deals include some stock financing. On their complete sample between 
years 1973 and 1998 Andrade et al. report that 35.4% of deals are financed purely with cash and 
45.6% purely with stock.
On the contrary to Andrade et al., Faccio and Masulis (2004) report that their sample of European 
mergers and acquisitions taking place between 1997 and 2000 contains 80% pure cash deals, 11.3% 
of pure stock deals and 8.4% of mixed financing deals.
The differences in method of payment distribution compared to Faccio and Masulis may be result 
from the fact that their sample of European transactions contains also private targets. Eighty percent 
(80%) of the acquisitions of unlisted targets in the Faccio and Masulis study are financed entirely 
with cash, whereas only 60% of the listed targets are acquired entirely by cash.
Table 19: Effects of Alternating Definitions for Method of Payment (1998-2003, N = 3242)









Cash Deals 1 700 52 % 1 710 53% 1 737 54 % 1 772 55 %
Stock Deals 1 081 33% 1 139 35% 1 183 36 % 1 247 38 %
Mixed Payment 461 14% 393 12 % 322 10% 223 7%
Total 3 242 100 % 3 242 100% 3 242 100% 3 242 100%
Since the sample used in this study consists of global data, it is necessary to analyze the differences 
of deal characteristics between different nationalities. Table 20 on the next page presents data 
regarding cumulative deal values, number of transactions and information about how major deal 
characteristics vary according to acquirer nationality. An interesting detail of Table 20 is that stock 
acquisitions account for 42% of the total transaction value.
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Table 20: Distribution of the Sample Deals by Acquirer Nationality (1998-2003, N = 3242)
Nationality N Transaction value ($bil)*







% of Deals 
with Acquirer 
M/B > Target 
M/В ~
Stock Payment 
% of total 
value
U.S. 1819 2792 55.7 % 31.0 % 86 % 43%
U.K. 306 790 15.8 % 4.55 % 87% 34%
France 97 279 5.56 % 4.14 % 76% 59%
Japan 159 202 4.02 % 15.0 % 81 % 52 %
Germany 58 176 3.51 % 5.92 % 78 % 25 %
Canada 199 125 2.49 % 2.28 % 91 % 46%
Italy 38 100 1.99 % 3.40 % 84 % 38%
Netherlands 53 70 1.40 % 1.17 % 87% 35%
Spain 31 63 1.26 % 1.78 % 94 % 66 %
Bermuda 22 50 1.01 % 0.01 % 100% 25%
Switzerland 31 49 0.98 % 0.76 % 71 % 33 %
Australia 105 47 0.93 % 1.19% 90% 33%
Belgium 18 41 0.82 % 0.72 % 100% 32 %
Hong Kong 10 38 0.77 % 0.52 % 70% 98%
Singapore 25 30 0.60 % 0.29 % 84 % 39 %
Sweden 36 19 0.39 % 0.76 % 92 % 53%
Denmark 21 18 0.36 % 0.40 % 95% 25%
South Africa 35 18 0.36 % 0.40 % 83% 44%
Taiwan 16 18 0.35 % 0.98 % 94 % 4%
Russia 6 15 0.30 % 0.82 % 100 % 2%
Finland 18 14 0.29 % 0.38 % 83% 53%
Others 139 61 1.21 % 23.5 % 91 % 62%
Total 3242 5017 ($bll) 86% 42%
‘Countries ranked according to cumulative transaction value
GDP data is acquired from Statistics Finland: http://www.stat.fi/tk/tp/maailmanumeroina/
As could be expected, U.S. based acquisitions account for 55.7% of the total deal value and 56.1% 
of total number of deals. Moreover, U.S. deals combined with Japan, Canada and major European 
countries U.K., France, Germany and Italy comprise 84.6% of the total global transaction value 
between 1998 and 2003. Table 18 includes also relative shares of world gross domestic product 
(GDP) from year 2000. Compared to relative shares in world GDP, relatively most active acquirer 
countries have been Bermuda, United Kingdom, Singapore and United States. On the contrary, 
companies domiciled in Japan, Russia and Germany have not been nearly as active in the takeover 
market as would be expected by the level of economic activity in their home countries.
In the global data used this thesis 86% of the acquirers have higher market-to-book -ratios 
compared to targets. The figure is somewhat higher compared to the 66% of Andrade et al. (2001) 
in U.S. data between 1973 and 1998. Nonetheless it strongly supports Hypothesis 1 stating that 
more highly valued firms acquire less highly valued firms.
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With respect to the connection of method of payment and acquirer nationality, companies from 
Hong Kong, Spain, France and Finland have been relatively most active stock acquirers. On the 
contrary Russian, Taiwanese and German firms have been most keen on cash financing.
There does not seem to be big differences in comparisons of market-to-book -ratios of targets and 
bidders. In each country at least acquirer M/В is higher than target M/В in at least 70% of the deal. 
However, compared to United States (86%), major European countries Germany (78%) and France 
(76%) have to some extent fewer deals where acquirer M/В exceeds target M/B.
In order to further describe the distribution of market-to-book -ratios in the sample, Table 21 below 
presents the market-to-book -ratios and count of transactions divided according to target and 
acquirer industries by using 1-digit Standard Industry Codes (SIC). The industry definitions of 1- 
digit SIC codes are presented in Appendix 2.
Table 21: Comparison of Market-to-Book -Ratios by 1-Digit SIC-Codes (1998-2003, N = 3242)
Acquirers SIC 1 SIC 2 SIC3 SIC 4 SIC 5 SIC 6 SIC 7 SIC 8 SIC 9
Average 2.37 4.55 5.05 4.93 3.56 2.78 6.87 6.01 3.90
Median 2.00 2.52 2.82 2.76 2.48 2.12 4.15 3.78 3.90
Min 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.325 0.075 0.06 0.31 2.03
Max 17.07 28.66 48.81 38.61 13.86 48.20 47.85 39.97 5.77
St.dev. 1.84 4.84 6.44 6.24 2.88 3.68 8.18 6.89 2.64
N 210 338 519 223 157 689 349 67 2
Targets SIC 1 SIC 2 SIC3 SIC 4 SIC 5 SIC 6 SIC 7 SIC 8 SIC 9
Average 1.77 3.35 2.95 3.22 2.44 1.58 4.71 3.39 n/a
Median 1.32 1.88 1.78 1.82 1.51 1.34 2.28 1.84 n/a
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 n/a
Max 14.3 43.96 36.27 47.70 31.90 13.50 45.63 33.75 n/a
St.dev. 1.78 4.95 3.92 5.11 3.55 1.14 6.67 5.83 n/a
N 172 295 487 178 156 630 413 71 -
Mean
Difference 0.60 1.20 2.10 1.71 1.13 1.20 2.16 2.62 -
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6.1.2 Comparison to Stock Market Valuation Levels
As stated in the studies by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003) 
the transaction value appears to correlate with a major stock index. Figure 4 below exhibits the 
quarterly transaction value compared to Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Stock Price Index. 
Correlation in the figure seems to be quite apparent.









Q1/1998 Q1/1999 Q1/2000 Q1/2001 Q1/2002 Q1/2003
Even more interestingly, the percentage of transactions financed by stock appears to correlate with 
share indexes. Figure 5 on the next page illustrates the effect. It presents a comparison of quarterly 
percentage of stock financed Nasdaq-based acquisitions compared to average Nasdaq Index 
calculated from daily closing prices20. This is consistent with of both Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2003), whose theories predict that stock market valuation 
levels have an impact on the choice of payment in mergers and acquisitions.
20 ."Nasdaq-based” stands for acquisitions in which the acquirer is listed in NASDAQ Stock Exchange
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However, while Figure 5 indicates that there appears to be a connection between stock financing 
and stock market valuation, it must be stated that the effect is evident only in U.S. data. No 
correlation seemed to occur e.g. between method of payment in European transactions and major 
European stock indices, or in Japanese transactions and NIKKEI Index. The reason for this 
ambiguity remains unclear.
Figure 5: Percentage of Stock Financed Transaction Value in Deals with NASDAQ-Listed Acquirer Compared 




6.2 RESULTS OF UNIVARIATE TESTS
Comparisons of acquirer and target market-to-book -ratios are done in several separate t-tests. 
While the univariate t-tests are not very robust methods for making general inferences, they provide 
important information about the sample data. Similar univariate tests are performed e.g. in the 
working paper by Dong et al. (2003).
Testing of Hypothesis 1: Comparisons within industries
Running t-tests for the means differences of average market-to-book -ratios within same industry 
supports hypothesis stating that acquirers have higher ratios. T-statistics shown in Table 22 are 
statistically significant at least at 1% level in each industry. This supports very strongly Hypothesis 
1 stating that acquirer market-to-book -ratios are higher than target ratios.
Table 22: Mean Difference t-Tests of Target and Acquirer M/В -Ratios within Same Industries
SIC1 SIC2 SIC3 SIC4 SIC5 SIC6 SIC7 SIC8
Mean Difference 0.60 1.20 2.10 1.71 1.13 1.20 2.16 2.62
N 380 631 1004 399 311 1317 760 136
t-Stat 3.21 3.07 6.19 2.94 3.09 7.85 4.02 2.42
Significance 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.017***
Note: *, **, and *** denote for statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Testing of Hypothesis 1: Deal Specific Comparison
Comparing the differences of market-to-book -ratios of target and acquirer in each deal further 
supports Hypothesis 1 stating that the acquirers are more highly valued in terms of market-to-book 
-ratio. Below is presented a summary table of a one-sample t-test comparing testing whether the 
average difference of acquirer market-to-book -ratio and target market-to-book -ratio differs from 
zero. T-statistic of 12.53 in a sample of 1751 observations strongly supports the assumption that 
acquirers are more highly valued than targets.
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Table 23: Deal-Specific Comparison of Acquirer and Target Market-to-Book Ratios






Note: *, **, and *** denote for statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Consequently as results illustrated in Table 22 and in Table 23 indicate, Hypothesis 1 can be 
accepted. This result is consistent with Martin (1996) and Andrade et al. (2001).
Testing of Hypothesis 2: Comparing M/B’s of Stock and Cash Acquirers
Next, I continue to test the Hypothesis 2 about the market-to-book -ratios of stock and cash 
acquirers. Firstly, I have grouped equal sized quintiles according to market-to-book -ratios. As the 
table below shows, the highest quintiles have higher probability for stock payment and lower 
probability for cash payment when compared to the lower quintiles. However, the differences are 
minimal and therefore do not allow for any conclusions. On the contrary, Dong et al. (2003) find 
than the differences between highest and lowest quintile are statistically significant at 1% level21. 
However, their methodology is different while Dong et al. group the acquirers to quintiles monthly 
while the on this thesis the grouping is done from the complete data of six years and therefore does 
not take into account the possible time-variance in market-to-book -ratios.
Table 24: Probabilities of Choosing Cash and Stock Payment by Acquirer M/В -Ratio Quintiles
Acquirer M/B Rank from Highest to 
Lowest All Stock All Cash Mixed N
1 33.9 % 49.4 % 16.7 % 511
2 35.0 % 50.3 % 14.7 % 511
3 33.1 % 54.2 % 12.7 % 511
4 31.9% 56.2 % 11.9 % 511
5 31.1 % 54.2 % 14.7 % 511
Difference 1-5 2.8 % -4.8 % 2.0 %
21 See Table 9 in Chapter 3.3
80
Hypothesis 2 is now tested by comparing the means of industry adjusted market-to-book -ratios of 
stock and cash acquirers using independent samples t-test. The test is made by comparing the mean 
ratio of deals that can be characterized as either stock or cash deals. The comparison in Table 25 
below shows that using both 100% and 70% definitions, the average and median market-to-book - 
ratio’s are higher in stock financed transactions. However, the results are statistically significant 
only in between the groups where the definition of method of payment is relaxed to 70% of the deal 
value.
Since the result of the t-test is contradicting, I continue to the logistic analysis analyzing the 
determinants explaining the choice of method of payment.
Table 25: Independent Sample t-Test Comparing the Industry Adjusted M/В -Ratios of Stock and Cash 
Acquirers
All Stock All Cash Min 70% Stock Min 70% Stock
Mean -1.92 -2.21 -1.93 -3.93
Variance 32.25 28.51 31.03 9.11
Observations 843 1350 971 1107
df 2191 2076
t-Stat 1.202 10.367
Significance (2-tailed) 0.230 0.000***
Note: *, **, and *** denote for statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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6.3 RESULTS OF LOGIT REGRESSIONS
This section presents the results of the main regression model used to find out whether the predicted 
variables are significant in the process of choosing the method of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions. Secondly, I present the results of a logistic regression ran on a sub-sample consisting 
of U.S. deals occurring during periods of high overall stock market valuations.
Table 26 on the next page is probably the most important piece of information in this thesis. 
Moreover, the correlation matrix of the variables used in the thesis is presented in Table 27 on page 
83. As the results in Table 26 show, the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny about acquirer valuation 
levels do not hold22. The sign of acquirer industry adjusted M/В -ratio is positive, but the low Wald 
statistic of 0.304 and thus low significance of 0.582 do not give any indication that the acquirer 
industry adjusted market-to-book -ratio would have impact on the choice over method of payment. 
Thus, the main Hypothesis 2 is clearly rejected. This result contradicts with those of Ang and Cheng 
(2003) and Dong et al. (2003). On the other hand, considerable differences in research 
methodologies do not allow for a direct comparison between the results.
Whereas the Sheifer and Vishny prediction does not seem to hold on general level, the predictions 
of Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan do seem to hold. The dummy variable indicating that periods of 
high stock market valuations contribute positively to the choosing of stock payment is statistically 
significant at 1% level. Consistently, months classified as periods of low stock market valuations 
have negative effect on the stock payment. The latter result is statistically significant at 5% level. 
Consequently Hypothesis 3 is clearly accepted.
Moreover, the sign on cross-border industry is negative as predicted, but the statistical significance 
is very low. On the contrary, signs on acquirer leverage and target size are negative indicating that 
higher leverage and bigger targets are not associated with stock payments. Thus, Hypotheses 4, 5 
and 6 are also rejected. Finally, the prediction power of this logit model is fairly poor while it has 
only 67.14% of correct predictions.
22 Obviously this statement is subject to the critisism that industry adjusted M/В -ratios can not be used for estimating
overvaluation.
82
Table 26: Results of Logit Regression Analysis Explaining Method of Payment
The sample consists of 1622 merger and acquisitions in the period of 1998 to 2003. The dependent variable (ALL STOCK) takes a 
value of 1 for acquisitions in which the transaction is financed entirely with stock, if any cash is used variable receives a value of 
zero. Industry adjustions to the M/В -ratio are done by subtracting the corresponding enterprise value weighted industry average 
(calculated from the sample firms) from the M/В -ratio of the company. Stock market conditions are definined using two procedures 
described in Chapter 5.3. All significance tests are two-sided. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 %, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.
Dependent Variable ALL STOCK (1=Yes)
Variable
Expected
Sign Coefficient Wald Significance
Acquirer and Target Characteristics
Acquirer industry adjusted M/B + 0,006 0,304 0,582
Target industry adjusted M/B +/- 0,005 0,126 0,723
Acquirer leverage + -0,160 0,440 0,507
Natural logarithm of Target Size + -0,022 0,066 0,797
Stock Market Conditions
High overall stock market valuations + 0,601 24,793 0,000
Low overall stock market valuations - -0,380 5,063 0,024
Industry Dummies
Acquirer Industry SIC 1 (dummy) 3,188 0,151 0,698
Acquirer Industry SIC 2 (dummy) 3,592 0,192 0,662
Acquirer Industry SIC 3 (dummy) 3,694 0,203 0,653
Acquirer Industry SIC 4 (dummy) 3,527 0,185 0,667
Acquirer Industry SIC 5 (dummy) 3,660 0,199 0,656
Acquirer Industry SIC 6 (dummy) 3,665 0,199 0,655
Acquirer Industry SIC 7 (dummy) 3,429 0,175 0,676
Acquirer Industry SIC 8 (dummy) 3,620 0,194 0,659
Deal Characteristics
Natural logarithm of transaction value + -0,017 0,039 0,844
Cross-Border Transaction (dummy) - -0,041 0,073 0,788
Cross-Industry Transaction (dummy) - 0,234 2,930 0,087
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A Sub-Sample of U.S. Bull Market Acquisitions
As presented in Chapter 5.3, the methods of classifying months to periods of high and low overall 
stock market valuations were built on Standard & Poor’s 500 Composite Index. Since S&P 500 
consists of U.S. companies and nearly half of the deals in the sample are from outside of U.S., a 
look at a sub-sample consisting only of deals with U.S. as the acquirer domicile is needed.
Moreover, to test the Hypothesis 4 stating that the significance of high market-to-book -ratios is 
higher during periods of high overall stock market valuations, it is necessary to filter out deals that 
occur during months that are defined as normal or low overall valuations. Furthermore, as Figures 4 
and 5 in Chapter 6.1 pointed out, there appears to be a clear correlation between the method of 
payment and high overall stock market valuation levels. An additional reason for the construction of 
the sub-sample is that initial results from regressions run for a data consisting of global deals taking 
place during periods of high overall stock market valuations did not produce any interesting results.
Consequently, Table 28 on the next page presents the results of a logit regression of 150 U.S. 
transactions taking place during the 14 months classified as bull markets. As the table shows, high 
acquirer market-to-book -ratios are a factor in choosing stock as the method of payment during 
periods of high stock market valuations at 5% statistical significance level. The difference in Wald 
Statistics of acquirer M/В between the full sample and the sub-sample is obvious23. Consequently, I 
accept the Hypothesis 4 stating that high acquirer valuation levels are a factor in choosing the 
method of payment during periods of high overall stock market valuations.
This supports the intuition that the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny do not apply to an average 
deal, since mergers and acquisitions have many other drivers besides possible stock market 
misvaluation. However, dining peak periods of stock market valuations, it is more likely that highly 
valued companies try to capitalize on their floated share prices by acquiring other companies before 
their share prices return to intrinsic levels.
Moreover, the hypotheses concerning cross-border deals, acquirer leverage and target size are 
rejected also in this model. Finally, the prediction power has increased significantly, while 82.67% 
of the predictions by the model are correct.
23 Wald statistic for acquirer M/В in the full sample is 0.304 while in the sub-sample it is 3.965
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Table 28: Results of Logit Regression Analysis of Sub-Sample Consisting of U.S. Deals During Periods of High 
Stock Market Valuations
This table presents the results of the logit regression model run for a subsample of 150 U.S. mergers and acquisitions 
occuring during months that are defined as periods of high stock market valuations during 1998-2003. The dependent 
variable (ALL STOCK) takes a value of 1 for acquisitions in which the transaction is financed entirely with stock, if any cash 
is used variable receives a value of zero. Industry adjustions to the M/В -ratio are done by subtracting the corresponding 
enterprise value weighted industry average (calculated from the sample firms) from the M/В -ratio of the company. Stock 
market conditions are definined using two procedures described in Chapter 5.3. All significance tests are two-sided. ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1 %, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable ALL STOCK (1=Yes)
Variable
Expected
Sign Coefficient Wald Significance
Acquirer and Target Characteristics
Acquirer industry adjusted M/B + 0,083 3,965 0,046
Target industry adjusted M/B +/- -0,123 1,690 0,194
Acquirer leverage + -0,718 0,397 0,529
Natural logarithm of Target Size + 0,461 1,473 0,225
Industry Dummies
Acquirer industry SIC 1 (dummy) -6,705 0,063 0,802
Acquirer industry SIC 2 (dummy) -0,394 0,101 0,751
Acquirer industry SIC 3 (dummy) -0,967 0,675 0,411
Acquirer industry SIC 4 (dummy) 1,815 1,156 0,282
Acquirer industry SIC 5 (dummy) -1,260 0,589 0,443
Acquirer industry SIC 6 (dummy) -0,827 0,397 0,529
Acquirer industry SIC 7 (dummy) 





Natural logarithm of transaction value + -0,556 2,060 0,151
Cross-Border Transaction (dummy) - 0,564 0,433 0,511
Cross-Industry Transaction (dummy) - 0,621 1,035 0,309
Additional Model Details
Intercept 0,426
-2 Log Likelihood 124,35
Nagelkerke R2 0,1762




7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was investigate whether stock market driven acquisitions -theory by 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and market valuation and merger waves -theory by Rhodes-Krofp and 
Viswanathan (2003) affect the acquirer’s choice of method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. 
Before the concluding discussion, a summary table of the results of this thesis is presented below.
Table 29: Summary of the Results
Hypothesis t-Test Results Logit results
HI Both stock and cash bidders are on average higher valued than targets Accepted*** n/a
H2
Acquirers with high equity valuations 
measured by industry adjusted market-to- 
book -ratios choose stock as the method of 
payment in mergers and acquisitions
Mixed result Rejected
H3 Favorable general stock market valuation levels increase possibility for a stock bid n/a Accepted***
H4
Acquirers with high market-to-book -ratio 
choose stock as medium of payment more 
often during periods of favorable overall 
stock market valuation levels
n/a Accepted for U.S. data**
H5 Cross-border acquirers prefer cash as method of payment n/a Rejected
H6 Large targets are acquired rather by stock than cash n/a Rejected
H7 Low acquirer leverage is associated with cash financing n/a Rejected
Note: *, **, and *** denote for statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
As the table shows, the most important contribution of this thesis is the finding that as predicted by 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, periods of high overall stock market valuations are highly 
correlated with stock payments in mergers and acquisitions. Furthermore, as further predicted by 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, periods of high overall stock market valuations seem to create an 
opportunity for the acquirers to used their highly valued equity as currency in acquisitions.
On the contrary to the initial assumptions of this thesis, the main prediction of the main theory by 
Shleifer and Vishny that overvaluated firms use stock payment appears to hold only during bull 
markets.
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Moreover, the result that 86% of the acquirers have higher market-to-book -ratios than targets is 
consistent with the earlier research by Martin (1996) and Andrade et al. (2001). From the 
perspective of the Q-theory (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2003) the market for corporate control 
appears to function as it should: Resources flow from low valuated companies to highly valuated 
companies.
The main finding concerning the correlation of stock payment and bull markets may also be 
explained by other factors besides misvaluation. An intuitive psychological aspect is that managers 
and owners are more willing to take on risks and challenges when everything looks good and the 
overall market sentiment is positive. Rising share prices represent more wealth and therefore 
support ideas that people either become ‘velocity-blind’ and do not recognize the risks or the risk­
taking ability becomes relatively larger when wealth-levels crow.
Furthermore, talking about misvaluation in finance literature is always controversial. Even more 
controversial is to propose a proxy for such a phenomenon. Consequently, while the predictions of 
the Shleifer and Vishny misvaluation theory are very straight-forward as such, it is extremely 
difficult to empirically verify them at least by using such a divisive measure for valuation as M/B - 
ratio is. Perhaps an approach identical to Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2003) using a 
break-down of market-to-book -ratio would be better in catching the misvaluation effects 
associated with mergers and acquisition. On the other hand, a more precise method of categorizing 
firms to groups of high and low valuation would bring about better results. Compared to e.g. to the 
widely supportive findings of Dong et al. (2003), the findings of this thesis offer extremely limited 
support to the Shleifer and Vishny misvaluation theory.
Finally, it would be interesting to study the long-term share price performance of the highly valued 
companies making stock purchases during periods of high overall stock market valuations. The 
results of such study would extremely useful for determining whether the predictions of Sheifer and 
Vishny hold or not.
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APPENDIX 2: U.S. Standard Industry Code (SIC 1987) Descriptions
SIC Code
1-digit SIC Code 




Mineral and Construction Industries
Metal mining
12 1 Coal mining
13 1 Oil and gas extraction
14 1 Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels
15 1 General building contractors
16 1 Heavy construction contractors
17 1 Special trade contractors
20 2
Manufacturing
Food and kindred products
21 2 Tobacco manufactures
22 2 Textile mill products
23 2 Apparel and other textile products
24 2 Lumber and wood products
25 2 Furniture and fixtures
26 2 Paper and allied products
27 2 Printing and publishing
28 2 Chemicals and allied products
29 2 Petroleum and coal products
30 3 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products
31 3 Leather and leather products
32 3 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products
33 3 Primary metal industries
34 3 Fabricated metal products
35 3 Industrial machinery and equipment
36 3 Electrical and electronic equipment
37 3 Transportation equipment
38 3 Instruments and related products
39 3 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
41 4
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities
Local and interurban passenger transit
42 4 Motor freight transportation and warehousing
43 4 U.S. Postal Service
44 4 Water transportation
45 4 Transportation by air
46 4 Pipelines, except natural gas
47 4 Transportation services
48 4 Communications
49 4 Electric, gas, and sanitary services
Source: U.S. Cencus Bureau website:
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm
APPENDIX 2: U.S. Standard Industry Code (SIC 1987) Descriptions
SIC Code
1-digit SIC Code 




Wholesale and Retail Trade
Wholesale trade-durable goods
51 5 Wholesale trade-nondurable goods
52 5 Building materials, hardware, garden supply, & mobile
53 5 General merchandise stores
54 5 Food stores
55 5 Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations
56 5 Apparel and accessory stores
57 5 Furniture, home furnishings and equipment stores
58 5 Eating and drinking places
59 5 Miscellaneous retail
61 6 Nondepository credit institutions
62 6 Security, commodity brokers, and services
63 6 Insurance carriers
64 6 Insurance agents, brokers, and service
65 6 Real estate
67 6 Holding and other investment offices
70 7
Service Industries
Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other lodging plac
72 7 Personal services
73 7 Business services
75 7 Automotive repair, services, and parking
76 7 Miscellaneous repair services
78 7 Motion pictures
79 7 Amusement and recreational services
80 8 Health services
81 8 Legal services
82 8 Educational services
83 8 Social services
84 8 Museums, art galleries, botanical & zoological garden
86 8 Membership organizations
87 8 Engineering and management services
88 8 Private households
89 8 Miscellaneous services
91 9
Public Administration
Executive, legislative, and general government
92 9 Justice, public order, and safety
93 9 Finance, taxation, and monetary policy
94 9 Administration of human resources
95 9 Environmental quality and housing
96 9 Administration of economic programs
97 9 National security and international affairs
Source: U.S. Cencus Bureau website:
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm
